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a b s t r a c t
We formally study the determinants, magnitude and distribution of eﬃciency gains gener-
ated in multilateral linkages between permit markets. We provide two novel decomposition
results for these gains, characterize individual preferences over linking groups and show that
our results are largely unaltered with strategic domestic emissions cap selection or when
banking and borrowing are allowed. Using the Paris Agreement pledges and power sector
emissions data of ﬁve countries which all use or considered using both emissions trading and
linking, we quantify the eﬃciency gains. We ﬁnd that the computed gains can be sizable and
are split roughly equally between effort and risk sharing.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
«[E]conomic theory suggests [carbon] markets should merge, and over time they probably will merge because of beneﬁts
of consolidation, including stability and lower cost.
…
[A recent study on linking found] beneﬁts accrued for all parties as the market grew, though some parties beneﬁttedmore
than others… Expanding the partnership can be welfare improving in total but it can have distributional effects… [That
is,] different countries may beneﬁt more or less depending on the mix of buyers and sellers who join any given market.»
— Forbes, December 7, 2015
1. Introduction
Markets for emission permits have become an important policy instrument in responding to the climate change externality.
A patchwork of emissions trading systems (ETSs), covering almost a quarter of global emissions, are now operational in juris-
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dictions including the EU, Switzerland, South Korea, New Zealand, China as well as several US states and Canadian provinces.
Many more are in the pipeline (ICAP, 2019; World Bank, 2019). For the most part, permits cannot be traded across systems and
the observed autarky prices for permits, their variability and comovement differ signiﬁcantly. If these ETSs can be integrated
through linking, substantial cost savings can in principle become available due to increased eﬃciency and stability. The opening
quotes recognize these savings and highlight that although linking can be beneﬁcial to all partnering jurisdictions, thorny distri-
butional issues may arise depending on who the linking partners are. Understanding the determinants of multilateral linkages
and how beneﬁts from linking are shared is therefore a natural question, yet research is so far limited (Mehling et al., 2018). In
this paper we propose a general model to describe and rigorously analyze multilateral linking, which presents an opportunity
for achieving the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement cost-effectively (Bodansky et al., 2016).
Our analysis quantiﬁes the eﬃciency gains from linking which accrue to an individual jurisdiction participating in an arbi-
trary linkage group. We establish two decompositions of these gains. The ﬁrst one identiﬁes two independent sources of eﬃ-
ciency gains, namely effort- and risk-sharing gains. The former results from the heterogeneity in both abatement technologies
and ambition levels of the group members. The latter is attributable to risk pooling associated with the uncertainty affecting
each group member’s demand for permits, our focus in this paper. The second decomposition allows us to express individual
and aggregate gains in any linkage group as simple functions of aggregate gains in all its internal bilateral linkages, thereby
representing a linkage group as the union of its building blocks.
These decompositions are complementary. The decomposition into effort and risk sharing offers a compact and intuitive
interpretation of individual eﬃciency gains as a function of the expectation and variance of the autarky-linking price difference.
Yet, it is unclear prima facie how eﬃciency gains, especially those due to risk sharing, relate to jurisdictions’ characteristics.
In this respect, the decomposition into internal bilateral links enables us to easily compute the eﬃciency gains generated by
arbitrary linkage groups, which constitutes a pivotal tool for a quantitative illustration of our model. Additionally, it allows us
to tease out and formally analyze the determinants of linkage gains and preferences.
Speciﬁcally, to study the eﬃciency gains from linking ETSs multilaterally and under uncertainty we start from a standard
framework featuring permit demand shocks à la Weitzman (1974) and Yohe (1978). Our benchmark model is set up in a static
environment where domestic emissions caps are assumed exogenously given and ﬁxed to isolate the eﬃciency gains from
linkage. The benchmark model abstracts from endogenous selection of domestic caps and intertemporal permit trading. We
formally analyze the implications of allowing them in two extensions to our benchmark model below and show that our results
continue to hold.
Our bilateral decomposition result allows us to rank groups from the perspective of individual jurisdictions and characterize
the aggregate gains from the union of disjoint groups analytically. In turn, we emphasize why the conditions for the global mar-
ket to be themost preferred group universally are unlikely to be satisﬁed in practice andwe show that jurisdictional preferences
for smaller linkage groups cannot be aligned without politically unpalatable compensatory monetary transfers. Additionally, we
clarify the relationship between autarky and linking permit prices. In line with one’s intuition, we show that relative to autarky
linkage reduces price volatility on average though not necessarily for each individual entity. We provide a precise characteriza-
tion of this effect.
We illustrate the quantitative implications of our model by focusing on all possible linkages across ETSs covering the CO2
emissions from the power sectors of ﬁve real-world jurisdictions which all use or have considered both emissions trading and
linking. Speciﬁcally, we calibrate our model to Australia, Canada, the EU, South Korea and the USA assuming that each jurisdic-
tion implements its Paris Agreement pledge. We ﬁnd that the linkage group which includes all ﬁve jurisdictions can generate
total eﬃciency gains of up to $3.26 billion (constant 2005 US$) per annum which are split approximately equally between effort
sharing, $1.58 billion, and risk sharing, $1.68 billion. Despite generating the largest aggregate gains, we note that this group
is not the most preferred option unanimously. In fact, it is not the most preferred option for any individual jurisdiction. For
instance, the USA would gain the most in a linking group with Australia and Europe. This three-jurisdiction group would also
lead to lower price variability than in the group where all jurisdictions are linked.
How are these results altered if jurisdictions anticipate the option of future linking when choosing their domestic emis-
sions caps, or if unrestricted intertemporal permit trade is allowed? First, we endogenize domestic cap selection based on self
interest and in anticipation of linking à la Helm (2003). We derive closed-form solutions for the induced strategic and dam-
age welfare impacts from linkage. The signs and magnitudes of these impacts are ambiguous and depend on the modeling
structure and parameter distributions, as the subsequent literature attests, e.g. Carbone et al. (2009) and Gersbach and Winkler
(2011). Crucially, they exist independently of the eﬃciency gains we focus on here, justifying the omission of these effects from
the benchmark model. Second, we show in a multi-period setting how the introduction of unrestricted intertemporal permit
trading alters, but crucially does not eliminate, the eﬃciency gains due to linking. In our quantitative illustration we ﬁnd that
allowing for unrestricted intertemporal trading reduces the effort- and risk-sharing gains by about 30% and 60%, respectively.
Throughout we abstract from economic, political and other (in)direct costs of linking which could preclude linkages that are
otherwise beneﬁcial. For example, signiﬁcant and persistent differences in jurisdictional ambition levels imply some jurisdic-
tions, and some regulated ﬁrms within jurisdictions, are net permit buyers in mutually beneﬁcial trades but which nonetheless
trigger ongoing ﬁnancial transfers. These ﬁnancial transfers in the buying jurisdictions and ﬁrms, as well as the persistently
stricter-than-cap emission and higher permit price levels in the selling jurisdictions, can face political resistance (Jaffe et al.,
2009).
These and related considerations can be a motive for increasing jurisdictions’ emission caps strategically, e.g. as a result
of domestic political lobbying (Habla and Winkler, 2013; Marchiori et al., 2017). Moreover, properly accounting for the
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general equilibrium interactions between the price in a linked permit market and the rest of the economy (Babiker et al., 2004;
Carbone et al., 2009; Böhringer et al., 2014b), as well as the interactions with pre-existing distortionary tax systems (Bovenberg
and Goulder, 1996; Babiker et al., 2003; Barrage, 2019) can generate implicit costs due to relative price changes triggered by
linking. In addition, there are also direct transaction costs associatedwith inter-jurisdictional trading which might mitigate eﬃ-
ciency gains from linking (Baudry et al., 2019), e.g. due to a hierarchical transaction network structure (Karpf et al., 2018) and a
home bias (Hintermann and Ludwig, 2019).
In fact, the balance between the eﬃciency gains and linkage costs may be one reason why some jurisdictions are already
linked (e.g. California and Québec) while other links are expected to take a long time to emerge (e.g. the EU and the Chinese
national ETS). In this paper we exclusively study the eﬃciency gains from linkage not because we think the associated costs are
negligible but because the eﬃciency gains provide a potent incentive for jurisdictions to try to overcome them.
First and foremost, our paper is related to the literature on the economics of linking which has primarily emphasized three
sources of gains from linking agreements, namely price convergence, a cost-effective reallocation of abatement efforts and a
reduction of price volatility (Stevens and Rose, 2002; Flachsland et al., 2009; Fankhauser and Hepburn, 2010; Pizer and Yates,
2015; Ranson and Stavins, 2016; Doda and Taschini, 2017; Rose et al., 2018; Quemin and de Perthuis, 2019). Our two decompo-
sition results allow us to formalize and reﬁne these arguments in a multilateral setup under uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, we offer a
precise characterization of both effort-sharing and risk-sharing gains from linkage, qualifying the results in Newell and Stavins
(2003) and Caillaud and Demange (2017), who respectively studied eﬃciency gains in using market-based instruments relative
to command-and-control policies, and linking disjoint ETSs. Additionally, we utilize our bilateral decomposition result to get a
better sense of linkage preferences and we further characterize permit price properties.
While our work is framed in the context of linking permit markets, it also relates to the use of eﬃciency-improving trading
ratios within permit markets (Holland and Yates, 2015). It is similar in spirit to the multinational production-location deci-
sion studied in de Meza and van der Ploeg (1987) and the choice of decentralization in permit markets analyzed by Yates (2002).
Additionally, our results can have implications for interconnections between other types of supply-control programswith trans-
ferable licenses (e.g. production or ﬁshery quotas) and international trade (e.g. cross-border electricity trading or energy unions).
For instance, our paper formalizes some risk-sharing features attributable to permit transferability that were ﬁrst highlighted
in a more general context by Krishna and Tan (1999). In this respect, it also relates to several recent studies focusing on eﬃcient
risk sharing through international ﬁnance (Callen et al., 2015) or power interconnections (Antweiler, 2016).
Strategic aspects of inter-jurisdictional permit trading have been widely studied since the seminal contributions by Car-
raro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994) and Helm (2003). These papers reach somewhat pessimistic conclusions about the
prospects of self-enforcing international permit trading schemes, for example, that linking markets creates incentives to relax
domestic caps. More recently, Habla and Winkler (2018) ﬁnd that allowing for strategic delegation of domestic cap selection
leads to less stringent caps and higher aggregate emissions when permit markets are linked. We deliberately focus on effort-
and risk-sharing gains tomake a counterpoint and contribute to the literature that ﬁnds more positive results due to linking. For
example, Helm and Pichler (2015) ﬁnd that technology transfers among countries tend to reduce aggregate emissionswhen per-
mits are internationally tradable. Additionally, Holtsmark and Midttømme (2019) show that linking permit markets can induce
greater low-carbon investments and gradually lower emission caps, while Caparrós and Péreau (2017) and Heitzig and Kornek
(2018) discuss models of gradual expansion of linked markets.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the theoretical results. Section 3.1 pro-
vides a qualitative illustration in a three-jurisdiction world. Section 3.2 contains a calibrated quantitative illustration. Section
4 introduces two extensions: endogenous cap selection and intertemporal trading. Section 5 concludes. All numbered tables
and ﬁgures are provided at the end. There are two appendices dealing with the analytical derivations and proofs (A) and the
description of our calibrationmethodology (B).
2. Model
2.1. Economic environment
To keep the model parsimonious and within the canonical framework, we consider a standardmodel of competitivemarkets
for emission permits designed to regulate uniformly-mixed pollution in several jurisdictions in the manner of Weitzman (1974)
and Yohe (1978), or more recently as in Hoel and Karp (2002), Newell and Pizer (2003, 2008) and Habla and Winkler (2018). In
practice, the canonical framework used in these papers and others implies that we make three assumptions.
First, markets for permits are analyzed in isolation from the rest of the economy, i.e. interactions with other domestic and
international markets through changes in relative prices are absent. Also absent are the general equilibrium interactions with
pre-existing distortionary tax systems. As highlighted in the Introduction the effects emerging through these channels can be
signiﬁcant. Second, jurisdictions’ beneﬁts from emissions are expressed as quadratic functional forms which can be viewed
as local approximations of general speciﬁcations and were shown to trace their real-world counterparts well (Klepper and
Peterson, 2006; Böhringer et al., 2014a). Third, uncertainty is introduced in the form of additive shocks affecting jurisdictions’
unregulated emission levels. Our benchmark model is static and takes jurisdictional emissions caps as ﬁxed and independent of
the decision to link. In Section 4, we show that our main results continue to hold in two extensions where we (1) endogenize
domestic cap selection based on self interest in anticipation of linking à la Helm (2003) and (2) allow for intertemporal trading
which interacts with linking in a dynamic multi-period setting.
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Jurisdictions There are n jurisdictions and  = {1,… , n} denotes the set of jurisdictions. Aggregate beneﬁts from emissions
in jurisdiction i ∈  are a function of the jurisdiction-wide emissions level qi ≥ 0 and of the random variable 𝜃i such that
Bi(qi;𝜃i) = (𝛽i + 𝜃i)qi − q2i ∕(2𝛾i), (1)
where the parameters 𝛽 i > 0 and 𝛾 i > 0 control the intercept and slope of i’s linear marginal beneﬁt schedule, respectively.
1
Speciﬁcally, the parameter 𝛾 i reﬂects i’s abatement technology at the margin, hereafter technology for short. Thus, when com-
paring two jurisdictions i and j, 𝛾 i > 𝛾 j means that i has access to a lower-cost abatement technology than j.
Jurisdiction i’s laissez-faire emissions maximize its beneﬁts and are given by
q̃i = 𝛾i(𝛽i + 𝜃i). (2)
The shock 𝜃i thus affects i’s laissez-faire emissions. For analytical convenience and without loss of generality, we assume that
shocks are mean-zero with constant variance and that they may be correlated across jurisdictions. Speciﬁcally, for any pair (i, j)
we let
𝔼{𝜃i} = 0, 𝕍{𝜃i} = 𝜎2i , and Cov{𝜃i;𝜃j} = 𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j with 𝜎i ≥ 0 and 𝜌ij ∈ [−1;1]. (3)
For instance, 𝜃i > 0 may reﬂect a favorable shock that increases i’s beneﬁts from emissions, and therefore, the laissez-faire
emissions relative to baseline emissions qi = 𝔼{q̃i} = 𝛾i𝛽i.
Emissions caps The emissions cap proﬁle (𝜔i)i∈ is exogenous and ﬁxed. Having domestic caps independent of the decision
to link anchors the aggregate level of emissions and rules out strategic spillovers. This allows us to (1) have well-deﬁned autarky
outcomes that serve as references throughout, (2) isolate the eﬃciency gains from linkage, and (3) compare these gains across
linkages and jurisdictions in a meaningful way. We later relax this assumption in Section 4.1 and discuss its implications.
For clarity, we express caps as proportional to technology by an ambition parameter such that
𝜔i = 𝛼i𝛾i, where 𝛼i ∈ (0;𝛽i) for all i ∈ , (4)
which implies that jurisdictional caps are all – but not equally – stringent relative to baseline. In particular, notice the negative
relationship between 𝛼i and the level of ambition implicitly embedded in i’s domestic cap, i.e. 𝜔i → qi when 𝛼i → 𝛽 i.
Autarky equilibria Under autarky, jurisdictions comply with their own caps. We assume that 𝜃i > 𝛼i − 𝛽 i for all i and
shock realizations so as to focus on interior autarky equilibria exclusively. That is, there are weak restrictions on individual
shocks such that domestic caps are always binding. Speciﬁcally, autarky permit prices are positive and read
pi = pi + 𝜃i > 0 for all i ∈ , (5)
where pi = 𝛽i − 𝛼i > 0 denotes i’s expected autarky price and notice pi is lower for jurisdictions with higher 𝛼i.2 First, note
that for a positive (resp. negative) shock realization 𝜃i, i’s autarky price is above (resp. below) pi. Second, note that when autarky
prices differ – whether it be due to differences in ambitionmeasured by pi or shock realizations – the aggregate abatement effort
is not eﬃciently allocated among jurisdictions. In particular, cost-eﬃciency could be improved by shifting some abatement away
from relatively high-ambition (resp. high-shock) to low-ambition (resp. low-shock) jurisdictions until autarky price differentials
are eliminated. We now characterize and quantify how linkage performs such a function.
2.2. Multilateral linkage and market equilibrium
Let  ⊆  be a non-empty subset of . We call  a group and -linkage the linked permit market between all jurisdictions
in group . An interior -linkage equilibrium consists of the (|| + 1)-tuple (p, (q,i)i∈), where p is the equilibrium permit
price in the linked market and q,i denotes jurisdiction i’s equilibrium level of emissions.
3 The equilibrium is characterized by
the equalization of marginal beneﬁts across jurisdictions in  and market clearing, that is
MBi(q,i;𝜃i) = 𝛽i + 𝜃i − q,i∕𝛾i = p for all i in , and
∑
i∈
q,i = Ω =
∑
i∈
𝜔i, (6)
1 Jurisdiction i’s beneﬁts correspond to the aggregate beneﬁts accruing to all ﬁrms located within its boundaries. Indeed, covered ﬁrms are all united by a
uniform price on emissions, which causes their marginal beneﬁts to equalize. By horizontal summation, individualmarginal beneﬁt curves can thus be combined
into one aggregate marginal beneﬁt curve. Therefore, only the eﬃciency side of linking is covered here and the intra-jurisdictional distributional aspects are
outside the scope of the paper.
2 Lecuyer and Quirion (2013) and Goodkind and Coggins (2015) provide explicit treatments of corner solutions in related contexts and demonstrate they
can be of importance. Appendix B describing the calibration for our quantitative illustration shows that the interior equilibria assumption is innocuous for our
quantitative results since pi > 2𝜎i for all i ∈  we study. That is, assuming the shocks are normally distributed, zero-price corners occur with less than 2.5%
probability in autarky and, a fortiori, under linkage.
3 Speciﬁcally, we further assume all jurisdictional shocks are bounded from above such that zero-emissions corners do not occur as a result of a link. In
Appendix B, we show that such corners are typically rare since 𝛽i > p + 2𝕍{Θ̂}1∕2 for all jurisdictions i and groups  we study. Our focus on interior market
equilibria is thus innocuous for our analysis and allows simpliﬁcation in (1) computing expected gains from linkage as damages from aggregate emissions are
constant and (2) determining the linking price uniquely.
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whereΩ denotes’s cap. Cost-eﬃciency requires that any jurisdiction abates in proportion to its own technology, i.e. q̃i − q,i =
𝛾ip. In particular, the -linkage equilibrium price can be expressed as the technology-weighted average of autarky prices, that
is
p = p + Θ̂, with p =
∑
i∈
𝛾ipi∕Γ and Θ̂ =
∑
i∈
𝛾i𝜃i∕Γ, (7)
where Γ =
∑
i∈𝛾i measures ’s technology. Additionally, jurisdictional net permit demands are proportional to technology
and the difference between the autarky and prevailing linking prices, that is
q,i − 𝜔i = 𝛾i(pi − p). (8)
In particular, jurisdiction i is a net permit importer (resp. exporter) under -linkage provided that pi > p (resp. pi < p), i.e. the
linking price is lower (resp. higher) than its autarky price. Ceteris paribus, this shows that-linkage is observationally equivalent
to an increase (resp. decrease) in i’s effective cap relative to autarky.
2.3. Eﬃciency gains in multilateral linkages
Because aggregate emissions are invariant, the welfare impacts from linkage only stem from an improvement in cost-
effectiveness, i.e. a reduction in the costs of meeting the group-wide emissions cap Ω.4 Speciﬁcally, the economic eﬃciency
gains accruing to i under -linkage denoted 𝛿,i correspond to the difference between i’s beneﬁts under -linkage (inclusive of
proceeds from permit trading in the linked market) and autarky, that is
𝛿,i = Bi(q,i;𝜃i) − p(q,i − 𝜔i) − Bi(𝜔i;𝜃i) = (q,i − 𝜔i)2∕(2𝛾i) = 𝛾i(pi − p)2∕2 ≥ 0. (9)
It is a well-known result that with ﬁxed caps, linkage is mutually beneﬁcial, i.e. eﬃciency gains are always non-negative. We
characterize these gains further in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under -linkage, the expected eﬃciency gains accruing to jurisdiction i ∈  can be decomposed into effort- and
risk-sharing gains, namely
𝔼{𝛿,i} = 𝛾i𝔼{(pi − p)2}∕2 = 𝛾i(𝔼{pi − p}2
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟
effort sharing
+ 𝕍{pi − p}
⏟⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏟
)
risk sharing
∕2 = 𝛾i((pi − p)2 + 𝕍{𝜃i − Θ̂})∕2.
(10)
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.1. □
Jurisdiction i’s expected eﬃciency gains from -linkage are proportional to the expectation of the square of the difference in
autarky and -linkage prices, i.e. the square of the distance in autarky-linking prices.5 Crucially, eﬃciency gains can be decom-
posed into two non-negative components.6
The effort-sharing component is proportional to the square of the expected autarky-linking price wedge, relates to the intra-
group variation in domestic ambition levels (i.e. expected autarky prices) and is independent of the shock structure. Intuitively,
the larger this wedge, the larger the gains associated with the equalization of jurisdictional marginal beneﬁts on average. In
practice, however, signiﬁcant disparities in expected autarky prices can compromise the political feasibility of a link for two
reasons. First, they imply sizeable, persistent and politically-unpalatablemonetary transfers associatedwith permit ﬂows across
jurisdictions. Second, they may connote different preferences in terms of environmental ambition or role of the carbon price
signal as a domestic climate policy instrument.
The risk-sharing component is proportional to the variance of the autarky-linking price wedge, relates to jurisdictional and -
wide shock characteristics, and is independent of jurisdictions’ ambition levels.7 That is, provided realized shocks differ across
partnering systems, linking induces a strictly positive gain compared to the case without uncertainty, which is a strict Pareto-
improvement due to risk pooling. Intuitively, controlling for the intra-group variation in expected autarky prices, the larger the
ex-post wedge in autarky and linking prices, the larger the gains due to risk sharing. For instance, all else equal, i will prefer to
be in linkage groups where the price happens to be high w.r.t. its expectation when i’s (counterfactual) domestic price would
have been low w.r.t. its expectation, and vice versa.
Moreover, because the -linkage price is the technology-weighted average of autarky prices in members of , all else equal,
it is primarily driven by jurisdictions with higher 𝛾′s. Similarly, for jurisdictions of similar technology, it is largely determined
by those jurisdictions whose permit demand is highly variable. Therefore, only considering the risk-sharing component of gains,
one expects that high-𝛾 and high-𝜎 jurisdictions may prefer to link with several jurisdictions to augment their autarky-linking
4 In Section 4.1, we characterize two additional welfare impacts when domestic caps are endogenous with the decision to link, namely a strategic effect and
a damage effect. Assuming invariant caps shuts down these two components but is without loss of generality for our characterization of eﬃciency gains.
5 This result is the analog of Proposition 4.1 in Caillaud and Demange (2017). Moreover, note that summing 𝛿,i =
(
q,i −𝜔i
)2∕(2𝛾i) over i ∈  and taking
expectation yields the aggregate comparative advantage of decentralization w.r.t. centralization for uniformly-mixed pollutants in Yates (2002).
6 Appendix A.1 clariﬁes the sources of the eﬃciency gains identiﬁed in Proposition 1 by explicitly characterizing the reduction in the costs of emissions control
under linking.
7 In other words, risk-sharing gains are invariant, irrespective of how caps are selected. See Section 4.1.
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price distances. By contrast, low-𝜎 (resp. low-𝛾) jurisdictions may prefer to link exclusively with a single low-𝜎 (resp. high-𝛾 )
jurisdiction, for otherwise the inﬂuence of that jurisdiction on the link outcome is likely to be mitigated. We further discuss the
complex dependence of linkage preferences on the correlation coeﬃcients in the next section and illustrate it using a qualitative
example in Section 3.1.
2.4. Bilateral decomposition of gains in multilateral linkages
Equation (10) offers a compact and intuitive interpretation of jurisdictional gains in terms of autarky-linking price distance.
This clariﬁes the behavior of the effort-sharing component, but it remains unclear prima facie how the risk-sharing component
relates to jurisdictional characteristics. To illuminate this further, we unpack Equation (10) and to focus momentarily on the
determinants of the risk-sharing component, we assume identical ambition across jurisdictions so that autarky-linking price
wedges arise only due to shocks, i.e. pi − p = 𝜃i − Θ̂. Substituting this into Equation (9) and using the deﬁnition of Θ̂, we
obtain
𝛿,i = 𝛾i
(∑
j∈
𝛾j(𝜃i − 𝜃j)
)2
∕(2Γ2

). (11)
Expanding the above and taking expectations then yields
𝔼{𝛿,i} = 𝛾i
⎛⎜⎜⎝
∑
j∈
𝛾2
j
(𝜎2
i
+ 𝜎2
j
− 2𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j) +
∑
(j,k)∈2
𝛾j𝛾k(𝜎2i + 𝜌jk𝜎j𝜎k − 𝜌ik𝜎i𝜎k − 𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j)
⎞⎟⎟⎠∕(2Γ2). (12)
For clarity of interpretation, we ﬁrst consider the most elementary group  = {i, j}, i.e. a bilateral linkage. Letting
Δ{i,j} = 𝛿{i,j},i + 𝛿{i,j},j denote the aggregate economic gains from {i, j}-linkage, Equation (12) simpliﬁes and gives
𝔼{Δ{i,j}} = 𝛾i𝛾j(𝜎2i + 𝜎
2
j
− 𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j)∕(2Γ{i,j}) ≥ 0, and (13a)
𝔼{𝛿{i,j},i}∕𝔼{𝛿{i,j},j} = 𝛾j∕𝛾i. (13b)
Intuitively and as described further in Doda and Taschini (2017), the aggregate risk-sharing gains from {i, j}-linkage are (1)
positive as long as jurisdictional shocks are imperfectly correlated and jurisdictional volatility levels differ, for otherwise the
two jurisdictions are identical in terms of shock characteristics, (2) increasing in both jurisdictional volatilities and technology
parameters, (3) higher the more weakly correlated jurisdictional shocks are, and (4) for a given group’s technology, maximal
when jurisdictions have identical technology. Additionally, note that aggregate gains are apportioned between jurisdictions in
inverse proportion to technology parameters. This is so because, for a given volume of trade, the distance between the autarky
and linking prices is greater in the higher-cost technology jurisdiction.
Returning to the general case of any -linkage, we could pursue a similar approach to compute 𝔼{𝛿,i} as i’s expected gains
from a bilateral linkage between i and ⧵{i}. However, the nature of the entity ⧵{i} becomes exceedingly complex as the
cardinality of  increases.
In this respect, one of our contributions is to recognize that bilateral linkages constitute the building blocks of themultilateral
linkage analysis. Speciﬁcally, in a given linkage group, we show that it is more convenient to express the associated quantities
as a function of the group’s internal bilateral linkage quantities. With the tacit convention that Δ{i,i} = 0 for any i, we can state
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Any  -linkage can be decomposed into its internal bilateral linkages. That is, -linkage gains (inclusive of both effort-
and risk-sharing components) accruing to jurisdiction i ∈  write as function of the aggregate gains in all bilateral linkages within 
𝛿,i =
∑
j∈⧵{i}
{
Γ⧵{i}Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} − (𝛾i∕2)
∑
k∈⧵{i}
Γ{j,k}Δ{j,k}
}
∕Γ2

. (14)
The number of such internal bilateral links is triangular and equals
( ||+1
2
)
.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.2. □
Proposition 2 helps us tease out jurisdictional linkage preferences. Speciﬁcally, jurisdiction i is better off linking with sets of
jurisdictions such that on the one hand, the aggregate gains in bilateral links between i and each jurisdiction in these sets are
high, and on the other hand, the aggregate gains in bilateral links internal to these sets are low. Referring to the above description
of the determinants of the risk-sharing gains in bilateral links, these desirable sets, from the perspective of i, should comprise
of jurisdictions that are similar to each other, with higher 𝜎 and 𝛾 than i, and negatively correlated with i. At the extreme and
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considering only the risk-sharing component of gains, i would ideally like to link with as many replicas of its most preferred
bilateral linking partner as possible.
Additionally, summing Equation (15) over all i ∈  gives
Δ =
∑
i∈
𝛿,i =
∑
(i,j)∈2
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j}∕(2Γ). (15)
In words, the aggregate -linkage gains write as a technology-weighted sum of all gains from bilateral linkages within . This
decomposition result permits a more practical formulation and quantiﬁcation of gains generated by an arbitrarily large group.
Moreover, it allows us to provide an intuitive description of the eﬃciency gains in linking disjoint groups of linked jurisdictions.
Speciﬁcally, let ′ ⊂  and″ be the complement of ′ in , i.e.= ′ ∪ ″ and ′ ∩ ″ = ∅. Then, we can express the aggregate
gains in  as a function of those in ′ and ″ by unpacking Equation (15), that is
Δ =
⎛⎜⎜⎝Γ′Δ′ + Γ″Δ″ +
∑
(i,j)∈′×″
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j}
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∕Γ. (16)
Note that the third term in the parenthesis captures the interaction among jurisdictions in ′ and ″, which is precisely the
quantity we want to isolate. To do so, we denote the aggregate gains of merging groups ′ and ″ by Δ{′,″} and deﬁne them
by Δ{′,″} = Δ −Δ′ − Δ″ . With this deﬁnition, Appendix A.3 shows that
𝔼{Δ{′,″}} =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
∑
(i,j)∈′×″
Γ{i,j}𝔼{Δ{i,j}} − Γ″𝔼{Δ′ } − Γ′𝔼{Δ″}
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∕Γ ≥ 0, (17)
which is non-negative given the mutually beneﬁcial nature of linkage with ﬁxed caps. That is, the aggregate expected gains from
the union of disjoint groups is no less than the sum of the separate groups’ aggregate expected gains.8 This implies the standard
result that -linkage – the global market – is the linkage arrangement that is conducive to the highest aggregate cost savings in
complying with the aggregate capΩ .
2.5. Risk-sharing and permit price properties under linkage
The -linkage price p = p + Θ̂ is composed of two terms. The former, p = 𝔼{p} =
∑
i∈𝛾ipi∕Γ, is commensurate with
the stringency of the group-wide cap relative to baseline emissions. It measures the marginal cost of abatement when the
group-wide expected abatement effort is allocated cost-eﬃciently. The latter, Θ̂ =
∑
i∈𝛾i𝜃i∕Γ, quantiﬁes the price impact
due to the variability of the stringency of the group’s cap relative to laissez-faire emissions that would be consistent with a
proﬁle of realized shocks. Indeed, given (𝜃i)i∈, the quantity
∑
i∈𝛾i𝜃i measures the difference in the group’s laissez-faire and
baseline emissions. Then, dividing it by the group-wide technology Γ gives the corresponding price impact.
Next, we characterize the features of linkage in terms of risk-sharing by analyzing the properties of the linking permit price
variability. As deﬁned formally in Appendix A.4, a partition  ′ of  is coarser than a partition  if  ′ can be obtained from  by
some sequence of linkages between groups in  .9 With this terminology we can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Linkage reduces permit price volatility on average in groups and partitions, but not necessarily for each of their
member jurisdictions. That is,
(a) Linkage diversiﬁes risk since for any group  and partitions ( , ′) with  ′ coarser than  , we have
Γ𝕍{p}1∕2 ≤
∑
i∈𝛾i𝕍{pi}1∕2 and
∑
∈ ′Γ𝕍{p}1∕2 ≤
∑
∈Γ𝕍{p}1∕2.
(b) Under -linkage, only when shocks are independent does it hold that p-lim||→+∞p = p. In particular, relative to autarky,
linkage always reduces price volatility in higher volatility jurisdictions but may increase it in lower volatility jurisdictions.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.4. □
Statement (a) indicates that linkage improves shock absorption and reduces price volatility on average relative to autarky. In
a given group, the linking price volatility is smaller than the technology-weighted average of autarky price volatilities. That is, the
variability of the group’s cap stringency is less than the one implied by its members’ individual cap stringencies taken together.
Importantly, this property extends to partitions: the coarser a partition, the more diversiﬁed the domestic shocks on average.
Obviously, on the ﬂip side, linking implies that relative to autarky jurisdictional emission levels are uncertain and contingent
on own and linkage partners’ shock realizations. This, however, can be desirable as it dampens the impact of domestic shocks
8 Speciﬁcally, linkage is superadditive given ﬁxed caps. In a related context, Proposition 2 in Hennessy and Roosen (1999) shows that merging ﬁrms covered
under a permit market is superadditive but an analytical description of the gains as in Equation (17) is not provided.
9 Byway of example, consider that = {1,… ,6}with
⋃6
i=1 i = . Then
′ = {1 ∪ 2,3,… ,6} and″ = {1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3,4,5 ∪ 6} are both coarser
than  , and  ″ is also a coarsening of  ′ .
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much like a supply-side control in a hybrid instrument does by introducing some responsiveness in domestic caps.10
Although linkage-induced diversiﬁcation guarantees that price volatility is reduced on average in a group, Statement (b) indi-
cates that (1) enlarging a group does not always imply lower price variability, which would be true only if domestic shocks were
independent and (2) not every member jurisdiction necessarily experiences a reduction in price volatility w.r.t. autarky. On the
one hand, relatively volatile jurisdictions always experience reduced price volatility w.r.t. autarky as domestic shocks are spread
over a thicker market and thus better cushioned. On the other hand, because linkage also creates exposure to foreign shocks,
relatively stable jurisdictions may face higher volatility relative to autarky. We emphasize that linkage is always preferred to
autarky even when it leads to higher price variability domestically, i.e. despite the fact that a jurisdiction might ‘import’ addi-
tional volatility as a result of the link. This holds because jurisdictional regulators are risk-neutral and because domestic and
foreign shocks are of a fundamental nature, i.e. they lead to permit price differences, the elimination of which is the very source
of eﬃciency gains.
3. Illustrations
3.1. Qualitative illustration
In this section we illustrate our theoretical results in a stylized setup with three jurisdictions i, j and k. Taking jurisdiction
i’s perspective, we compare its linkage options graphically in Fig. 1. Throughout we assume that jurisdictions have identical
ambition levels, i.e. autarky permit prices are equal in expectation across jurisdictions, and effort-sharing gains are thus nil. The
calibrated quantitative illustration in Section 3.2 relaxes this assumption and provides monetary evaluations of both effort- and
risk-sharing gains.
We start by describing the key features of Fig. 1. The axes are the same across the panels of the ﬁgure and measure 𝛾 j
and 𝛾k with respect to the innocuous normalization 𝛾 i = 1. The dot in the center of each panel identiﬁes the point where the
jurisdictions’ technologies are identical, i.e. 𝛾 i = 𝛾 j = 𝛾k = 1. Throughout we also refer to the casewhere 𝜎i = 𝜎j = 𝜎k > 0
and 𝜌ij = 𝜌ik = 𝜌jk = 0 as the symmetric uncertainty benchmark (SUB).
In Panel 1a we rule out the possibility of all three jurisdictions linking together, i.e. {i, j, k}, to focus on the simpler case
of i’s possible bilateral linkage groups, namely {i, j} and {i, k}. In this case, the 45◦ line depicts the indifference frontier along
which {i, j} and {i, k} generate the same risk-sharing gains for i.11 Above the frontier i prefers to link with k because k has a
lower-cost abatement technology than j does. All else constant, deviations from SUB such as 𝜎i = 𝜎j < 𝜎k or 𝜌ij = 0 > 𝜌ik
distort the indifference frontier to the dashed curve. These deviations imply that k is i’s preferred partner in a larger region of
the {𝛾 j, 𝛾k}-space.
In Panel 1b we revert back to SUB but now allow for the formation of {i, j, k} in addition to the bilateral links just discussed.
First, observe that at the point of identical technologies, i prefers {i, j, k} to the bilateral linkages. This is to be expected because
with j and k ex ante identical, {i, j, k} is twice as large as the bilateral groups i could form and therefore offers more abatement
opportunities ex post.12 Now note that i’s indifference point between {i, j, k} and bilateral linkages (denoted by a diamond)
implies 𝛾 i < 𝛾 j = 𝛾k. Indeed, given the restrictions implicit in SUB, it must be that j and k can each offer suﬃciently cheaper
abatement opportunities to i to render bilateral linkages at least as rewarding as {i, j, k}.
Second, deviations from SUBwhich do not break symmetry between j and k would move the point of indifference along the
45◦ line. For example, 𝜎i < 𝜎j = 𝜎k would move the point of indifference northeast, thereby expanding the region in which
{i, j, k} is the preferred option symmetrically around the 45◦ line, and vice versa. Additionally, Panel 1c shows the implications
of breaking the symmetry implicit in SUB. The case depicted in this panel distorts the indifference frontier in favor of the bilateral
group {i, k}which is consistent with deviations from SUB such that 𝜎i = 𝜎j < 𝜎k or 𝜌ik < 𝜌ij = 𝜌jk = 0.
Finally, it is informative to characterize j and k’s linkage preferences in the same {𝛾 j, 𝛾k}-space. Panel 1d superimposes
the linkage indifference frontiers for the three jurisdictions under SUB. The dark grey area at the center represents the zone
where {i, j, k} is simultaneously preferred by all three jurisdictions and should thus endogenously emerge. Here, {i, j, k} is every
jurisdiction’s best option only when the technology parameters 𝛾 j and 𝛾k do not deviate much from 𝛾 i. Under more general
conditions than under SUB, it is not clear prima facie whether jurisdictional characteristics are such that {i, j, k} is the most
preferred linkage option for all jurisdictions simultaneously.
The light grey areas at the top and in the southwest corners of Panel 1d represent the zones where i and k respectively
prefer {i, k}-linkage the most. These zones do not overlap, so {i, k}-linkage cannot form endogenously without compensatory
transfers. More generally, if jurisdictional linkage preferences are not aligned, in the sense that there is at least one jurisdiction
whose most preferred option is not {i, j, k}, then we can show that a jurisdiction’s most preferred group cannot simultaneously
be the favourite of every other jurisdiction in that group.13 Only inter-jurisdictional transfers could change this. In aworldwhere
10 In the normative framework of instrument selection, much has been written about the problem of perfectly inelastic permit supply since the seminal
contribution by Roberts and Spence (1976) and, in general, hybrid instruments have been shown to outperform both pure price and pure quantity instruments.
In our setup linking increases the price elasticity of permit demand whereas a hybrid instrument increases the price elasticity of permit supply, typically by
introducing steps in supply curves, see e.g. Fell et al. (2012a).
11 The analytical expressions for the indifference frontiers are available from the authors upon request.
12 See Doda and Taschini (2017) for a discussion of the effects of market size on risk-sharing gains.
13 See Appendix A.5 for a proof in the general case.
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Fig. 1. Linkage preferences in the three-jurisdiction world {i, j, k}.
transfers often face signiﬁcant political-economy obstacles and thereby prove unwieldy, this non-alignment result can in part
explain why linkage negotiations do not readily deliver large linkage groups.
3.2. Quantitative illustration
In this section we explore our model quantitatively by considering linkages between hypothetical ETSs regulating the CO2
emissions from the power sector of ﬁve real-world jurisdictions with different levels of ambition and which are subject to
different shocks.We assume annual compliancewithout permit banking and borrowing across compliance periods and compute
the annual effort- and risk-sharing gains implied by our model.14
Data description, model calibration and caveats We provide an overview of our calibration strategy, which is detailed
in Appendix B. We focus on ﬁve jurisdictions with similar levels of development and which all use, or have considered, both
emissions trading and linking: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), the European Union (EUR), South Korea (KOR) and the United
States (USA). We obtained estimates of the annual baseline emissions and marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) for the
14 Section 4.2 provides an extension to study the attenuation in both effort- and risk-sharing gains due to linking when unrestricted intertemporal trading is
allowed for the empirically relevant parameter values.
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Table 1
Annual baseline emissions (qi , 10
6tCO2) and annual emissions caps (𝜔i , 10
6tCO2) obtained from Enerdata.
Calculated expected autarky permit prices (pi , 2005US$/tCO2), calibrated ﬂexibility coeﬃcients (𝛾 i ,
103(tCO2)2∕2005US$), linear intercepts (𝛽 i, 2005US$/tCO2) and ambition coeﬃcients (𝛼i = 𝜔i∕𝛾 i ,
2005US$/tCO2) obtained using Enerdata data.
EUR AUS USA CAN KOR
qi 841.8 171.3 1946.8 90.2 287.5
𝜔i 724.1 150.1 1469.3 66.3 225.8
pi 89.8 27.1 92.8 113.7 92.6
𝛽 i 642.5 218.5 378.2 428.9 432.0
𝛾 i 1309.9 784.1 5146.4 210.2 665.3
𝛼i 552.7 191.4 285.5 315.4 339.5
𝛾i∕qi 1.6 4.6 2.6 2.3 2.3
Table 2
Coeﬃcients of variation of autarky permit prices (𝜎i∕pi), pairwise correlation
coeﬃcients (𝜌ij) and AR(1) shock persistences (𝜑i).
EUR AUS USA CAN KOR
𝜎i∕pi 0.35 0.44 0.24 0.49 0.52
EUR 1
AUS 0.36 1
USA 0.07 0.42 1
CAN 0.18 0.18 0.43 1
KOR −0.15 0.24 0.51 0.00 1
𝜑i 0.79 0.71 0.82 0.89 0.67
power sector of these jurisdictions in 2030 from Enerdata, a private research and consulting ﬁrm whose clients include several
national governments, UNDP and the European Commission. Based on the Ener-Blue scenario of the POLES model, the company
also provided us with its estimates of the annual emission caps consistent with the achievement of the 2030 targets deﬁned in
the Nationally Determined Contributions as announced at the Conference of Parties in Paris.
Equipped with these caps and MACCs, we compute the expected autarky permit prices using our model which range from
27.1$/tCO2 in AUS to 113.7$/tCO2 in CAN. The annual baselines (qi), emission caps (𝜔i) and corresponding expected autarky
permit prices (pi) are reported in Table 1, which also contains the linear intercepts (𝛽 i) and technology coeﬃcients (𝛾 i) we
calibrate with a linear interpolation of MACCs in the vicinity of domestic caps.15
We calibrate the shock properties using the residuals from the regression of historical emissions on time and time squared
with data from the International Energy Agency. These shocks capture the net effect of stochastic factors that may inﬂuence
emissions and their associated beneﬁts, e.g. business cycles, TFP shocks, jurisdiction-speciﬁc events, changes in prices of factors
of production, weather ﬂuctuations, etc. Table 2 provides the volatility of the autarky permit prices as measured by the coeﬃ-
cient of variation, as well as the pairwise shock correlations implied by our theory. We note that there is large cross-jurisdiction
variation in autarky price variability and that there are instances where the correlation between shocks is negative (e.g. KOR
and EUR) or effectively zero (e.g. KOR and CAN).
Before proceeding to a discussion of our results, we point out a number of theoretical and quantitative caveats. Theoretically,
all strategic and general equilibrium considerations which have a bearing on the costs of linking, and therefore are relevant for
the equilibrium cap levels or optimal emissions, are left out by construction. In other words, our partial equilibrium approach
does not account for the welfare impact of changes in relative prices within (say due to changes in power prices) and across (say
due to changes in terms of trade) jurisdictions. Also, absent are potentially ampliﬁed/diminished distortions in labor and capital
markets.
Quantitatively, the POLES model of Enerdata is in essence a black box for us but we take its results as given. Accordingly,
our quantitative results are sensitive to the assumptions of that model and its Ener-Blue scenario, particularly regarding the
productivity and availability of abatement technologies in 2030 which determine our jurisdictions’ marginal beneﬁt schedules.
Finally, we limit the analysis to the power sector due to data and cost constraints. This is the most natural and relevant sector
to consider as it consists of large stationary sources which are easy to regulate, thus always brought under ETS regulations
ﬁrst. Bringing in additional sectors would imply some degree of intra-jurisdictional effort and risk sharing which could reduce
eﬃciency gains from inter-jurisdictional trading despite a larger market size overall. These caveats imply that the per-annum
eﬃciency gains computed below should be taken as illustrative upper bounds and with a large grain of salt.
Discussion Thanks to the bilateral decomposition result in Proposition 2 we can adopt a combinatorial approach to quanti-
fying the annual monetary gains, in constant 2005US$, accruing to every jurisdiction in every possible linkage group.
15 The parameter 𝛾 i compounds the productivity of i’s abatement technology and i’s volume of regulated emissions. As such, comparing the ratios 𝛾i∕qi can
give us a sense of the ordering of the volume-adjusted costs of abatement opportunities at the margin in the vicinity of the domestic caps. For instance, Table 1
shows that AUS has the cheapest abatement opportunities whereas the most expensive ones are in EUR.
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Proposition 1 shows the jurisdictional gains are composed of an effort-sharing component and a risk-sharing component.
These are illustrated in Fig. 2 using three possible partitions of the set of ﬁve jurisdictions. We denote them 5J (top panel)
when all ﬁve jurisdictions are linked together, and 2J3J (middle panel) and 2J3J (bottom panel) which generate the greatest
and smallest gains among the ten possible partitions where no individual jurisdiction is in autarky. 2J3J and 2J3J are given
by {{AUS,USA}, {CAN, EUR,KOR}} and {{AUS, EUR}, {CAN,KOR,USA}}. The ﬁgure shows (1) how a group’s gains are shared
among the member jurisdictions and (2) the sources of gains for each jurisdiction. The areas of the various rectangles are com-
Fig. 2. Distribution and decomposition of eﬃciency gains in 5J (upper panel), 2J3J (middle panel) and 2J3J (lower panel). Colors identify jurisdictions and color shades
identify risk- (dark) and effort-sharing (light) gains. The areas of the various rectangles are comparable across panels and proportional to the magnitude of the gains.
Dotted areas demarcate foregone eﬃciency gains relative to 5J. All numbers are billions of 2005US$ per year. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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parable throughout, and proportional to the magnitude of the gains.16 The colors identify jurisdictions and shades of a color
distinguish the effort-sharing (light) and risk-sharing (dark) gains. The dotted areas in the panels for 2J3J and 2J3J illustrate the
foregone gains with respect to 5J.
In 5J the aggregate effort-sharing gains amount to $1.58 billion, and those associated with risk sharing are $1.68 billion,
totalling $3.26 billion. Risk sharing is the dominant source of gains in all jurisdictions but AUS. At $1.38 billion AUS’s effort-
sharing gains account for almost 90% of aggregate effort-sharing gains. This is not surprising because the expected autarky-
linking price wedge in AUS is the largest ($27.1 vs $86.5 per tCO2). Conversely, EUR captures the largest risk-sharing gains
which amount to $0.62 billion or just over a third of the aggregate risk-sharing gains.
The sum of the eﬃciency gains generated in {AUS,USA} and {CAN, EUR,KOR} of 2J3J are smaller than 5J’s by about 14%, or
$0.45 billion. Most of the loss is due to the decline in the risk-sharing gains. The expected linking prices are given by $84.1 and
$93.0, respectively. The largest effort-sharing gains among all possible bilateral links occur in {AUS,USA}which is about 90% of
effort-sharing gains in 5J. This is true despite the fact that the expected autarky price difference between AUS ($27.1) and CAN
($113.7) is greater because assuming similar abatement technologies USA is a much larger market than CAN. Were AUS and
CAN to link their markets, the expected linking price would be too low ($45.4) relative to that in {AUS,USA} and result in sig-
niﬁcant effort-sharing gains going unrealized. Of course, effort-sharing gains are only part of the story and the ﬁgure shows the
risk-sharing gains generated in {AUS,USA} are small. Similarly, the risk-sharing gains generated in {CAN, EUR,KOR}, although
sizable, are smaller than those in 5J. This is because the absence of AUS and USA from this group reduces risk diversiﬁcation
opportunities signiﬁcantly.
The groups {AUS,EUR} and {CAN,KOR,USA} in 2J3J generate low effort-sharing gains as evidenced by the large difference
between the groups’ expected linking prices, $66.4 and $93.5, respectively; and low risk-sharing gains by grouping positively
correlated jurisdictions together and thereby forgoing the opportunity of leveraging the negative correlation between EUR and
KOR. Together, these two linking groups imply that almost 40%, or $1.25 billion, worth of eﬃciency gains go unrealized relative
to 5J.
After illustrating the group-wide gains and how they are distributed across jurisdictions and across effort- and risk-sharing in
three select partitions, we now take an individual jurisdiction’s perspective and discuss eﬃciency gains and permit price volatility
it may expect in all groups where it is a member. The three panels of Fig. 3 use USA as an example. The top and middle panels
show the eﬃciency gains for USA and permit price volatility as a function of the number of members in the group.
First, observe that 5J is not the group that generates the largest gains for USA. In light of the previous section,we conclude that
5J will therefore not emerge naturally for these ﬁve jurisdictions, even though it would generate the largest gains in aggregate.
Neither is it the case that 5J delivers the lowest price volatility for USA which obtains in the bilateral link with EUR. In fact, USA
permit price volatility may increase relative to its autarky level (horizontal line in the middle panel). However, we emphasize
that in our model an increase in permit price volatility relative to autarky does not have any negative implications, which for
many jurisdictions in the real world can be an important consideration.
Second, there is not a monotonic relationship between the magnitude of eﬃciency gains and cardinality of a group. For
example, adding EUR to {AUS,USA} increases USA’s eﬃciency gains while adding KOR or CAN decreases them. Third, linkage
preferences do not tally. While USA would gain the more from adding EUR to {AUS,USA}, AUS would rather have KOR or CAN
join the bilateral group next as it would beneﬁt AUS more.
Finally, the bottompanel illustrates the large variation in the two components of gains across groups including USAwhich are
ordered so risk-sharing gains decline along the x-axis. In all groups where AUS is amember, USA enjoys signiﬁcant effort-sharing
gains driven by the large difference in expected autarky prices between AUS and the others. In groups with greater number of
members, USA effort-sharing gains tend to be lower as they are more diluted across jurisdictions relative to {AUS,USA}. Risk-
sharing gains also vary signiﬁcantly across all groups. USA eﬃciency gains consist almost exclusively of risk-sharing gains in
groups that do not include AUS (e.g. {EUR,KOR,USA}) and may be larger than effort-sharing gains in groups that do include
it (e.g. {AUS,EUR,USA}). These observations underline the need for a model to evaluate the eﬃciency gains from linking ETSs
multilaterally.
4. Extensions
4.1. Linking with endogenous cap selection
Our analysis of linkage in Section 2 assumes away strategic cap selection and takes domestic caps as given. This can be jus-
tiﬁed by reference to the domestic political-economy constraints that emerge from the complex internal negotiation processes
which must render the resulting policies acceptable to a host of actors with divergent interests, see e.g. Flachsland et al. (2009).
Deviating from one’s cap is therefore costly. However, one may contend that the prospects of inter-jurisdictional permit trading
will drive regulators to set their caps in anticipation of linking based on self interest.
In this case, Helm (2003) showed that jurisdictions which expect to be net sellers (resp. buyers) of permits on the linked
market have an incentive to inﬂate (resp. reduce) their caps relative to autarky to maximize their gains from linking. This
16 The small squares are an exception, e.g. KOR’s effort-sharing gains in 5J, and indicate gains too small to be visible in the graph.
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Fig. 3. Expected per-annum eﬃciency gains, coeﬃcients of variation of permit prices and components of gains in alternative linkage groups for USA.
strategic aspect and attendant shift in aggregate emissions and damages imply additional welfare impacts which in turn could
compromise the feasibility of linkage, and autarky may even welfare-dominate linkage. At a minimum, jurisdictional linkage
preferences may be altered. Below we analyze how endogenizing cap selection affects our analysis of linkage.
In what follows, we make the conventional assumption that marginal damages are constant and let 𝜂i denote i’s marginal
damage (Pizer, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003). This assumption is consistent with damages being determined by the global
cumulative emissions since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (Allen et al., 2009; Allen, 2016). Here, it implies that juris-
dictional reaction functions are orthogonal. We also assume that domestic caps are selected non-cooperatively with Cournot-
Nash conjectural variations.17
17 If caps are selected cooperatively within a group, the prospects of inter-jurisdictional trading are inconsequential for cap selection (Carbone et al., 2009). Our
results would be qualitatively similar under alternative conjectural variations because marginal damages are constant (MacKenzie, 2011; Gelves and McGinty,
2016).
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Under autarky jurisdiction i sets its cap 𝜔,i to maximize its beneﬁts net of damages, which simply yields 𝜔,i = 𝛾i(𝛽i − 𝜂i),
i.e. p,i = 𝜂i. This reﬂects the weak form of the international free-riding problem, i.e. the intercepts of the reaction functions
imply higher emission levels than in the global optimum, as i does not internalize the negative externality inﬂicted by its emis-
sions upon others.18 Socially-eﬃcient caps satisfy the Lindahl-Samuelson condition, are lower than the Cournot-Nash ones and
imply all jurisdictions face the same price p =
∑
i∈𝜂i in expectation, which is congruent with a global social cost of carbon
(Kotchen, 2018).
Under -linkage, endogenizing cap selection is congruent with a two-stage game where jurisdictions set their caps at stage
one and inter-jurisdictional permit trading occurs at stage two, which is typically solved in subgameNash perfection using back-
ward induction (D’Aspremont et al., 1983). As shown in Appendix A.6 jurisdiction i’s cap in anticipation of -linkage becomes
𝜔,i = (Γ − 𝛾i)(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂i) + 𝜔,i ≥ 𝜔,i ⇔ 𝜂i ≤ ⟨𝜂⟩, (18)
where ⟨𝜂⟩ = ∑i∈𝜂i∕|| is the average marginal damage in . Under the prospects of forming a linkage group the weak form of
the free-riding problem is magniﬁed (resp. mitigated) for relatively low-damage (resp. high-damage) jurisdictions and in turn,
inter-jurisdictional permit trading has an ambiguous effect on aggregate pollution relative to autarky since∑
i∈
[𝜔,i −𝜔,i] =
∑
i∈
𝛾i(𝜂i − ⟨𝜂⟩) ≷ 0, (19)
whose sign depends on the distributions of the 𝜂i’s and 𝛾 i ’s.
19 In fact, there is no consensus in the literature on this matter. For
instance, Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) and Lapan and Sikdar (2019) show that linkage increases aggregate emissions rel-
ative to autarky absent and present trade in other goods, respectively. Using a computable general equilibrium model, Carbone
et al. (2009) show that the opposite situation is more likely to occur.
The equilibrium market price under -linkage with endogenous cap selection reads
p∗

= ⟨𝜂⟩ + Θ̂. (20)
Note that the -linkage prices with ﬁxed and endogenous caps in Equations (7) and (20) are identical up to a shift in their
deterministic parts from
∑
i∈𝛾ipi∕Γ to
∑
i∈p,i∕|| and that i is a net seller in expectation i.f.f. 𝜂i ≤ ⟨𝜂⟩. Because endogenous
cap selection does not alter price variability, it will a fortiori not affect risk-sharing gains from linkage. Speciﬁcally, Helm (2003)
shows that with endogenous caps the welfare impacts from linkage can be decomposed into three components, namely the
eﬃciency gains from inter-jurisdictional trading, the strategic effect as measured by the market value of the difference in cap
choices under autarky and linking, and the damage effect of changes in aggregate emissions. In the following proposition, we
offer a precise analytical characterization of these three components.
Proposition 4. With endogenous cap selection, the expected welfare impacts from -linkage in jurisdiction i can be decomposed into
three components
𝔼{𝛿∗
i,} = 𝛾i ((𝜂i − ⟨𝜂⟩)2⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟
effort sharing ≥ 0
+ 𝕍{𝜃 i − Θ̂}
⏟⏟⏟
)
risk sharing ≥ 0
∕2 + ⟨𝜂⟩(Γ − 𝛾i)(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂i)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
strategic effect≷ 0
+ 𝜂i
∑
j∈
𝛾j(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂j)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
damage effect≷ 0
≷ 0.
(21)
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.6. □
As with exogenous caps in Proposition 1, eﬃciency gains have effort-sharing and risk-sharing subcomponents, which are
both non-negative. Observe that the latter is independent of cap selection which justiﬁes our focus on exogenous caps in Section
2. That said, the interplay between the three welfare components is intricate and the latter two effects can be positive or nega-
tive. The strategic effect is positive iff 𝜂i < ⟨𝜂⟩ while the damage effect is proportional to the variation in aggregate emissions
between autarky and linkage and thus hard to sign. Hence, with endogenous cap selection the net welfare effect of linkage is
ambiguous and the literature is again not decisive on this matter. With partial equilibriummodels, Godal and Holtsmark (2011)
and Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) ﬁnd that linkage is unlikely to yield welfare gains while Dijkstra et al. (2011) and Anto-
niou et al. (2014) ﬁnd just the opposite. With general equilibriummodels, Marschinski et al. (2012) and Böhringer et al. (2014a)
show that linkage-induced effects on welfare are ambiguous in general.
The above establishes the validity of our central result, namely Proposition 1, under strategic selection of domestic caps in
anticipation of linking. In passing, we note that Proposition 3 on the stochastic properties of permit prices is also unaltered, but
that Proposition 2, which provides an alternative formulation of individual eﬃciency gains, no longer holds.
18 Due to the linearity of damages our framework does not capture its strong form, i.e. the crowding-out of domestic abatement efforts (reaction functions are
negatively sloped with quadratic damages) which will always be strategic substitutes in a pure emissions game.
19 For instance, if 𝜂i = 𝜂𝛾 i for all i then Equation (19) reduces to 𝜂
∑
(i,j)∈2 (𝛾i − 𝛾j)
2∕(2||) ≥ 0 but note that this result is reversed if we assume 𝜂i = 𝜂/𝛾 i for all
i instead.
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4.2. Linking with banking and borrowing
Most if not all emissions trading systems allow for some form of intertemporal trading, that is banking issued permits for
future compliance or borrowing future permits for present compliance. In Section 2, we abstracted from banking and borrowing
when characterizing eﬃciency gains due to linking. By providing emitters with the opportunity to rearrange emissions over
time, intertemporal trading can in principle reduce the price variability under autarky which in turn should shrink the risk
pooling potential left over to linkage. In this section, we quantify the size and determinants of the eﬃciency gains due to linking
with unrestricted intertemporal trading. We ﬁnd that banking and borrowing does not eliminate the eﬃciency gains due to
linking, and in some cases may increase them. The result turns on the persistence of shocks over time, the discount factor and
the planning horizon.
For simplicity, we consider a stylized model of unrestricted banking and borrowing, which abstracts from constraints on the
amount of permits that can be banked or borrowed. Without loss of generality, we assume jurisdictions apply the same discount
factor 𝜆 and that their beneﬁt functions are time invariant. Additionally, given our discussion in the previous section, we revert
to exogenous caps and further assume they are constant over time. Allowing for intertemporal trading altersmarket equilibrium
permit prices but crucially not the deﬁnition of per-period linkage gains in Equation (14). In a given group  and period t we
denote by p⋆
,t
and p,t the prices with and without intertemporal trading, respectively.
20 Substituting them into (14) then gives
the corresponding linkage gains, which we respectively denote by 𝛿⋆
i,,t
and 𝛿i,,t . For instance, 𝛿
⋆
i,,t
= 𝛾i(p⋆i,t − p
⋆
,t
)2∕2 ≥ 0. That
is, allowing for intertemporal trading alters, but does not neutralize, the eﬃciency gains from inter-jurisdictional trading. Below,
we characterize 𝛿⋆
i,,t
as well as the ordering of 𝛿⋆
i,,t
and 𝛿i,,t .
Consider two adjacent time periods t and t + 1. We let 𝜃i,t and 𝜃i,t+1 denote the corresponding shocks in jurisdiction i and
assume that unconditional expectations are normalized to zero, i.e. 𝔼{𝜃i,t} = 𝔼{𝜃i,t+1} = 0. To specify the expectation of 𝜃i,t+1
conditional on 𝜃i,t we assume that the joint distribution of (𝜃i,t, 𝜃i,t+1) follows a standard AR(1) process. That is, using the
shorthand notation 𝔼t{·} to denote expectation conditional on all information available at period t, 𝔼t{𝜃i,t+1} = 𝜑i𝜃i,t where
𝜑i ∈ [−1;1] denotes the shock persistence.
Under autarky, the permit price in jurisdiction i in period twithout intertemporal trading is simply given by Equation (5), i.e.
pi,t = pi + 𝜃i,t . With intertemporal trading, the standard no-arbitrage condition with discounting and uncertainty (Samuelson,
1971; Schennach, 2000) is satisﬁed
p⋆
i,t = MBi(qi,t;𝜃i,t) = 𝜆𝔼t{MBi(qi,t+1;𝜃i,t+1)} = 𝜆𝔼t{p
⋆
i,t+1}. (22)
That is, the discounted permit price is a martingale. Additionally, invoking the tower rule, Equation (22) can be chained over
time with any given horizon of length h ∈ ℕ yielding
p⋆
i,t = MBi(qi,t;𝜃i,t) = 𝜆𝔼t{MBi(qi,t+1;𝜃i,t+1)} = · · · = 𝜆
h𝔼t{MBi(qi,t+h;𝜃i,t+h)}. (23)
We can solve for the period-t equilibrium price and expected price path with intertemporal trading over the horizon h using
Equation (23) and overall market closure at t + h, yielding
𝔼t{p⋆i,t+z} = 𝜆
−zp⋆
i,t for any z ∈ [[0; h]] with p
⋆
i,t =
(
(h + 1)pi + 𝜃i,tΦi
)
∕Λ, (24)
where Φi =
∑h
z=0 𝜑
z
i
and Λ =
∑h
z=0 𝜆
−z, and which reduces to p⋆
i,t
= pi,t only when 𝜑i = 1 and 𝜆 = 1.21 When 𝜆 < 1, the
deterministic part of p⋆
i,t
is smaller than that of pi,t due to temporal effort sharing. In practice, some abatement is postponed
because (h + 1)∕Λ decreases with h and 𝜆−1.22 Not surprisingly, intertemporal trading reduces price variability because
𝕍{p⋆
i,t} = (Φi∕Λ)
2𝕍{pi,t} ≤ 𝕍{pi,t}, (25)
since Φi∕Λ ≤ 1 with equality only when 𝜑i = 1 and 𝜆 = 1, or when h = 0. Given the properties ofΦi∕Λ, (1) the greater the
shock persistence, the less intertemporal trading can dampen the price impact of shocks23; (2) the longer the time horizon, the
more jurisdictions have ﬂexibility to spread out shocks over time, resulting in lower price variability today; and (3) the lower
the discount factor, the less marked the price impact of shocks today as ﬁrms prefer to pass on more of the shocks to future
periods. Only in the limit as h →∞ or 𝜆 → 0 is price variability nil and the intertemporally tradable quantity instrument closely
mimics the outcomes of a price instrument.24 That is, unrestricted banking and borrowing alone cannot in general absorb all
20 Period length is deliberately left unspeciﬁed and need only coincide with any multiple of a given compliance period length, usually a year.
21 We assume that the permit bank carried into t from t − 1, bi,t−1 , is zero for simplicity and without loss of generality. Accounting for past banking only intro-
duces an offset in the certain component of p⋆
i,t and thus leaves risk-sharing gains and the martingale property unchanged, see Equation (A.39) in Appendix A.7.
22 Similarly to linking, intertemporal trading generates effort and risk sharing gains. In a deterministic setting, temporal vs. spatial effort sharing gains have
been analyzed, see e.g. Stevens and Rose (2002).
23 This is not mathematically precise but conveys the core intuition. See Appendix A.7 for details.
24 In a seminal paper comparing price and quantity instruments for stock pollutants, Newell and Pizer (2003) hint at this result (see their footnote 7) but do
not develop it formally as their analysis abstracts from banking and borrowing. Extensions with intertemporal trading further quantify this result, see Equation
(9) in Fell et al. (2012b) or Newell et al. (2005) and Pizer and Prest (2016) for a particular focus on policy updating.
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contemporaneous price variability.25
Similarly, the -linkage equilibrium price in period t without intertemporal trading is given by Equation (7), i.e. p,t = p +∑
i∈𝛾i𝜃i,t∕Γ, whereas with intertemporal trading it reads
p⋆
,t =
(
(h + 1)p +
∑
i∈
𝛾i𝜃i,tΦi∕Γ
)
∕Λ, (26)
and in expectation grows at the discount rate 𝜆−1 − 1 over the horizon h. This implies that the static analysis of eﬃciency gains
in Section 2 remains valid with intertemporal trading if shocks are rescaled by Φi∕Λ to account for optimal, unlimited banking
and borrowing. We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 5. With unrestricted intertemporal trading over a ﬁnite time horizon of length h, the eﬃciency gains due to  -linkage
accruing to jurisdiction i in any period t amount to
𝔼{𝛿⋆
i,,t} = 𝛾i((h+ 1)
2(pi − p)2∕Λ2
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
effort sharing
+ 𝕍{𝜃⋆
i,t − Θ̂
⋆
,t}
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
)
risk sharing
∕2 ≷ 𝔼{𝛿i,,t}, (27)
where Θ̂⋆
,t
=
∑
i∈𝛾i𝜃
⋆
i,t
∕Γ and 𝜃⋆i,t = 𝜃i,tΦi∕Λ, withΦi =
∑h
z=0 𝜑
z
i
and Λ =
∑h
z=0 𝜆
−z.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.7 □
Proposition 5 extends Proposition 1 to a dynamic setup where, in addition to linking, unrestricted intertemporal trading
within horizon h is allowed. Although effort-sharing gains due to linking always decline when intertemporal trading is allowed,
risk-sharing gains can decrease or increase, resulting in non-negative eﬃciency gains which may be lower or higher than in the
case with no intertemporal trading. As further discussed in Appendix A.7, the ordering of 𝔼{𝛿⋆
i,,t
} and 𝔼{𝛿i,,t} depends on the
complex interaction between the time horizon h, the discount factor 𝜆 and the shock properties {𝜎i, 𝜌ij, 𝜑i}i,j∈ .
In our quantitative example, we argue that the eﬃciency gains due to linking are attenuated but not eliminated when
intertemporal permit trading is allowed. To that end, we ﬁrst note that when 𝜆 < 1 and shocks are similarly persistent across
jurisdictions, i.e. 𝜑i ≃ 𝜑 < 1 for all i ∈ , eﬃciency gains are always attenuated by intertemporal trading and the ratios of
effort- and risk-sharing gains with and without intertemporal permit trading are given by(
𝔼{p⋆
i,t
− p⋆
,t
}
𝔼{pi,t − p,t}
)2
≃
(
(h + 1)(1 − 𝜆−1)
1 − 𝜆−h−1
)2
< 1, (28a)
and
𝕍{p⋆
i,t
− p⋆
,t
}
𝕍{pi,t − p,t}
≃
(
(1 − 𝜑h+1)(1 − 𝜆−1)
(1 −𝜑)(1 − 𝜆−h−1)
)2
< 1. (28b)
Table 2 reports the estimated shock persistence parameters when an AR(1) process is ﬁtted to our data which are approx-
imately equal to 0.8 for all jurisdictions, i.e. 𝜑 ≈ 0.8, which is coincidentally identical to the value Newell and Pizer (2003)
estimate and use. Moreover, power producers typically hedge production up to three years ahead, so h = 3 seems a reason-
able ﬁrst-pass value.26 Finally, we take 𝜆 = 0.9 for the discount factor. Plugging in these values in Equation (28) we ﬁnd that
intertemporal trading eats away about 30% and 60% of the effort- and risk-sharing gains presented in Section 3.2, respectively.27
Notwithstanding the attenuation in eﬃciency gains, we note that under unrestricted banking and borrowing, Proposition 2 is
unaltered and Proposition 3 holds up to the shock rescaling above.
Finally, we highlight some of the differences between the stylized theory of intertemporal trading just analyzed and how it
operates in practice. First, our theory assumes unrestricted intertemporal trading. In reality, borrowing is almost never autho-
rized and banking can be limited, either by regulation via holding limits or due to ﬁrm-level internal or managerial constraints.
Fell et al. (2012b) show that these constraints matter: as soon as they are expected to bind, banking offers little ﬂexibility in
smoothing out shocks.28 Second, observed price dynamics in the EU ETS and elsewhere suggest that banking strategies by ﬁrms
are not optimal, which might inter alia be caused by regulatory uncertainty (Salant, 2016; Fuss et al., 2018). Third, ﬁrms may be
rationally short-sighted for hedging purposes or because they are poorly informed about future supply and demand conditions
(Neuhoff et al., 2012; Schopp et al., 2015; Quemin and Trotignon, 2019). Last but not least, some risk may be jurisdiction-
speciﬁc and so not diversiﬁable using intertemporal trading. Although a more comprehensive treatment of these considerations
25 Moreover, comparing Equations (7) and (24) shows that, from the perspective of i intertemporal trading is observationally equivalent to linking with h
uncorrelated replicas of i whose individual shocks are given by {𝜃i,t
∑z
s=0 𝜑
s
i
∕
∑z
s=0 𝜆
−s}z=1,…,h . In other words, we quantify how time periods and jurisdictions
are observationally equivalent ‘divisions’ in pollution permit markets as ﬁrst analyzed in Yates (2002).
26 See e.g. Neuhoff et al. (2012) and Schopp et al. (2015) and references therein in the case of the EU ETS. This 3-year hedging is typically incomplete as
producers keep opportunities open to exploit changes through time, which means eﬃciency gains are likely to be reduced by less than what Equation (28)
measures.
27 In practice, caps are declining over time, typically at a rate of 2% per annum. When this is the case, intertemporal trading implies that effort-sharing gains
decrease by 32% relative to 28% with constant caps.
28 This is qualitatively similar to a decrease in h or Samuelson effect, see e.g. Parsons and Taschini (2013).
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is in order, they can be thought of as impinging on intertemporal trading opportunities, de facto leaving more scope for inter-
jurisdictional trading.
5. Conclusion
This paper advances the frontier of research on permit market integration by proposing a general model to describe and
analyze multilaterally-linked ETSs formally in a partial equilibrium setup. In our model, eﬃciency gains and permit prices in
any linkage group are well-deﬁned objects and we study their analytical properties. First, we identify the two independent
components which constitute the eﬃciency gains in any multilateral linkage, namely the effort- and risk-sharing components.
The former is determined by the inter-jurisdictional variation in domestic ambition levels and the latter is driven by the nature of
the uncertainty affecting the demand for permits in individual jurisdictions. Second, we decompose anymultilateral linkage into
its internal bilateral linkages. That is, we characterize aggregate and individual gains in any linkage group as a weighted average
of the aggregate gains in all bilateral links that can be formed among its constituents. This decomposition formula is a practical
tool to compute the gains generated in arbitrary linkage groups. It further allows us to rank groups from the perspective of
individual jurisdictions and characterize the aggregate gains from the union of disjoint groups analytically. Third, we clarify the
relationship between autarky and linking prices and show that relative to autarky, linkage reduces price volatility on average but
not necessarily for individual entities. Finally, we show that our key ﬁndings hold when domestic caps are selected strategically
or when unrestricted intertemporal trading is allowed. In other words, risk-sharing gains from linkage are independent of cap
selection and remain substantial even when banking and borrowing is permitted.
Linkages between ETSs have a key role to play in the successful, cost-effective implementation of the Paris Agreement. To
shed light on themagnitude and distribution of eﬃciency gains from linkage, we use a quantitative applicationwith jurisdictions
of similar levels of development which use, or have considered, both emissions trading and linking. We calibrate our model
to the power sector CO2 emissions of Australia, Canada, the EU, South Korea and the USA under the assumption that each
jurisdiction implements its Paris Agreement pledges. The aforementioned theoretical and quantitative caveats of our analysis
notwithstanding, we ﬁnd that linking the ﬁve jurisdictions together can generate aggregate effort- and risk-sharing gains which
are sizable and approximately equal to each other in magnitude. This suggests our theoretical ﬁndings can have signiﬁcant
relevance in policy-oriented applications and help overcome the economic and political barriers to linking in practice.
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Appendices.
A. Analytical derivations and collected proofs
Throughout we will sometimes denote  = {1, 2,… ,m} for somem ∈ ⟦3;n⟧.
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 (effort- and risk-sharing gains)
Recalling the deﬁnition of i’s eﬃciency gains from -linkage in Equation (9), we have
𝛿,i = Bi(q,i;𝜃i) − p(q,i −𝜔i) − Bi(𝜔i;𝜃i)
= (𝛽i + 𝜃i − p)(q,i − 𝜔i) − (q2,i − 𝜔
2
i
)∕(2𝛾i)
= q,i(q,i − 𝜔i)∕𝛾i − (q2,i − 𝜔
2
i
)∕(2𝛾i)
= (q,i − 𝜔i)2∕(2𝛾i) = 𝛾i(pi − p)2∕2,
(A.1)
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where the third and ﬁfth equalities obtain via the ﬁrst-order condition in Equation (6) and the net permit demand in Equation
(8), respectively. Taking expectations and noting that 𝕍{X} = 𝔼{X2} − 𝔼{X}2 for some random variable X concludes the proof.
Next, wemake explicit the sources of the eﬃciency gains generated in -linkage by characterizing the reduction in emissions
control costs due to the link. Speciﬁcally, let ãi = q̃i − 𝜔i > 0 and ΔBi respectively denote i’s domestic abatement level and the
associated foregone beneﬁts due to compliance with i’s binding cap under autarky, that is
ΔBi (̃ai) = Bi(q̃i;𝜃i) − Bi(𝜔i;𝜃i) = ã2i ∕(2𝛾i), (A.2)
where the second equality follows from 𝜔i = q̃i − ãi and q̃i = 𝛾i(𝛽i + 𝜃i). By convexity of ΔBi , Jensen’s inequality implies that
an increase in uncertainty about laissez-faire emissions (and the corresponding cap stringency) raises the expected foregone
beneﬁts (or control costs) under autarky. Note that because 𝜃i is mean-zero, 𝔼{ΔBi (̃ai)} can be decomposed as
𝔼{ΔBi (̃ai)} = ΔBi(qi − 𝜔i) + 𝔼{ΔBi(q̃i − qi)} = 𝛾i(p2i + 𝜎
2
i
)∕2, (A.3)
where the ﬁrst term measures costs under certainty, which are proportional to i’s ambition level, and the second term captures
the increase in costs due to uncertainty, which is proportional to the shock variance. By the same token, the aggregate expected
control costs under -linkage read∑
i∈
𝔼{ΔBi(q̃i − q,i)} = Γ(p2 + 𝕍{Θ̂})∕2. (A.4)
Summing Equation (A.3) over i ∈  gives the corresponding aggregate expected control costs under autarky. Note that∑
i∈𝔼{ΔBi(q̃i − q,i)} ≤
∑
i∈𝔼{ΔBi(q̃i − 𝜔i)} as it jointly holds that Γp2 ≤
∑
i∈𝛾ip
2
i
and Γ𝕍{Θ̂} ≤
∑
i∈𝛾i𝜎
2
i
.29 In words,
for given caps, linkage induces a cost-effective reduction in the group’s expected control costs by (1) spreading the expected
aggregate abatement effort in proportion to each member’s technology and (2) improving the absorption of shocks within the
linked system. Hence the effort- and risk-sharing gains.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2 (bilateral decomposition)
We ﬁrst establish Equation (14). Substituting p =
∑
i∈𝛾ipi∕Γ into Equation (9) yields
𝛿,i = 𝛾i
(
m∑
j=1,j≠i
𝛾j(pi − pj)
)2
∕(2Γ2

)
= 𝛾i
m∑
j=1,j≠i
𝛾j
{
𝛾j(pi − pj)2 + 2
m∑
k>j,k≠i
𝛾k(pi − pj)(pi − pk)
}
∕(2Γ2

).
(A.5)
It is useful to note that the two following identities hold true
2(pi − pj)(pi − pk) = (pi − pk + pk − pj)(pi − pk) + (pi − pj)(pi − pj + pj − pk)
= (pi − pj)2 + (pi − pk)2 − (pj − pk)2, and
(A.6)
m∑
j=1
m∑
k>j,k≠i
𝛾j𝛾k
{
(pi − pj)2 + (pi − pk)2
}
=
m∑
j=1
m∑
k=1,k≠i,j
𝛾j𝛾k(pi − pj)2. (A.7)
Using these identities and rearranging the sums in Equation (A.5), we obtain that
𝛿,i = 𝛾i
m∑
j=1
𝛾j
{
(Γ − 𝛾i)(pi − pj)2 −
m∑
k>j,k≠i
𝛾k(pj − pk)2
}
∕(2Γ2

). (A.8)
Since the total {i, j}-linkage gains read Δ{i,j} = 𝛾i𝛾j(pi − pj)2∕(2Γ{i,j}) and Γ⧵{i} = Γ − 𝛾i , Equation (A.8) coincides with
Equation (14). Summing over all i ∈ [[1;m]] then gives
Δ =
m∑
i=1
𝛿,i =
m∑
i=1
{
m∑
j=1,j≠i
{
Γ⧵{i}Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} − 𝛾i
m∑
k>j,k≠i
Γ{j,k}Δ{j,k}
}}
∕Γ2

. (A.9)
Regrouping terms by bilateral linkages, Equation (A.9) rewrites
Δ =
∑
1≤i<j≤m
{
(Γ⧵{i} + Γ⧵{j})Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} −
m∑
k=1,k≠i,j
𝛾kΓ{i,j}Δ{i,j}
}
∕Γ2

=
∑
1≤i<j≤m
{
(Γ⧵{i} + Γ⧵{j} − Γ⧵{i,j})Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j}
}
∕Γ2

=
∑
1≤i<j≤m
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j}∕Γ.
(A.10)
29 The ﬁrst and second inequalities hold strictly provided that there exists (i, j) ∈ 2 such that pi ≠ pj and respectively 𝜌ij < 1 and/or 𝜎i≠ 𝜎 j . See Appendix A.4
for a proof.
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By symmetry, i.e. Δ{i,j} = Δ{j,i} , Equation (A.10) coincides with Equation (15).
As a side note, because variance is a symmetric bilinear operator, it holds that
𝕍{Δ} =
∑
(i,j)∈×
Γ{i,j}
∑
(k,l)∈×
Γ{k,l}Cov{Δ{i,j};Δ{k,l}}∕(2Γ)2. (A.11)
Intuitively, although it is clear that  = arg max⊆𝔼{Δ}, there is no reason that forming larger groups reduces volatility
of gains and a fortiori that  = arg min⊆𝕍{Δ}.
A.3. Proof of Equation (17)
With  and ′ in  such that ′ ⊂  and with ″ =  ⧵ ′, expanding Equation (15) gives
Δ =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
∑
(i,j)∈′×′
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} +
∑
(i,j)∈″×″
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} + 2
∑
(i,j)∈′×″
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j}
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∕(2Γ)
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝Γ′Δ′ + Γ″Δ″ +
∑
(i,j)∈′×″
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j}
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∕Γ.
(A.12)
The aggregate gains from linking ′ and ″ are Δ{′,″} = Δ − Δ′ − Δ″ so that
Δ{′,″} =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
∑
(i,j)∈′×″
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} +
(
Γ′ − Γ
)
Δ′ +
(
Γ″ − Γ
)
Δ″
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∕Γ
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
∑
(i,j)∈′×″
Γ{i,j}Δ{i,j} − Γ″Δ′ − Γ′Δ″
⎞⎟⎟⎠ ∕Γ.
(A.13)
By transposing Equation (13a) from two singletons to two groups, it holds that
𝔼{Δ{′,″}} = Γ′Γ″
(
𝕍{p′ } + 𝕍{p″} − 2Cov{p′ ; p″}
)
∕(2Γ) ≥ 0. (A.14)
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3 (linking price properties)
For any  in , ﬁrst note that price volatilities satisfy Γ𝕍{p}1∕2 ≤
∑
i∈𝛾i𝕍{pi}1∕2 with a strict inequality provided that
there exists (i, j) ∈ 2 such that 𝜌ij < 1. Indeed,
Γ2

𝕍{p} =
∑
(i,j)∈2
𝛾i𝛾jCov{pi; pj} ≤
∑
(i,j)∈2
𝛾i𝛾j𝜎i𝜎j =
(∑
i∈
𝛾i𝕍{pi}1∕2
)2
. (A.15)
Note that we have a similar inequality for price variances. Indeed, it jointly holds that
Γ2

𝕍{p} =
m∑
i=1
𝛾2
i
𝜎2
i
+ 2
∑
1≤i<j≤m
𝛾i𝛾j𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j, and (A.16a)
Γ
m∑
j=1
𝛾j𝕍{pj} =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
𝛾i𝛾j𝜎
2
j
=
m∑
i=1
𝛾2
i
𝜎2
i
+
∑
1≤i<j≤m
𝛾i𝛾j(𝜎2i + 𝜎
2
j
). (A.16b)
Then, Γ𝕍{p} ≤
∑
i∈𝛾i𝕍{pi} follows since 𝜎2i + 𝜎
2
j
≥ 2𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j and observe that the inequality holds strictly when there
exists (i, j) ∈ 2 such that 𝜌ij < 1 and/or 𝜎i ≠ 𝜎j.
Formally, a partition  ′ of  is coarser (or ﬁner) than partition  with | | ≥ 2 and d = | | − | ′| ≥ 1 if there exists a
sequence of partitions ( i)i∈[[0;d]] such that 0 =  ′, d =  and for all i ∈ ⟦1; d⟧ there exist (′i ,″i ) ∈  i ×  i ⧵ {′i} such that
 i−1 = {′i ∪ 
″
i
} ∪  i ⧵ {′i ,
″
i
}. It suﬃces to establish the rest of Statement (a) for a unitary linkage since the proof extends to
a more general case by transitivity over the relevant sequence of unitary linkages. Thus, let  = {1,… ,z} and assumew.l.o.g.
that  ′ = {1 ∪ 2,3,… ,z}. Then, it holds that∑
∈ ′
Γ𝕍{p}1∕2 =
z∑
k=3
Γk𝕍{pk}
1∕2 +
(
Γ2
1
𝕍{p1} + Γ
2
2
𝕍{p2} + 2Γ1Γ2Cov{p1 ; p2}
)1∕2
. (A.17)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives |Cov{p1 ; p2}| ≤ 𝕍{p1}1∕2𝕍{p2}1∕2 and concludes.
We now turn to Statement (b). Note that it is suﬃcient to verify the claim on jurisdictional price variability as a result of
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linkage for bilateral links – the argument naturally extends to multilateral links. Then, by applying Equation (A.16a) to {i, j}-
linkage it holds that
𝕍{p{i,j}} =
(
𝛾2
i
𝕍{pi} + 𝛾2j 𝕍{pj} + 2𝜌ij𝛾i𝛾j(𝕍{pi}𝕍{pj})
1∕2
)
∕Γ2

. (A.18)
Assume w.l.o.g. that jurisdiction i is the less volatile jurisdiction, i.e. 𝜎j ≥ 𝜎i. Then, {i, j}-linkage reduces price volatility in
the high-volatility jurisdiction i.f.f. 𝕍{pj} ≥ 𝕍{p{i,j}}, that is i.f.f.
𝛾i(𝜎2j − 𝜎
2
i
) + 2𝛾j𝜎j(𝜎j − 𝜌ij𝜎i) ≥ 0, (A.19)
and unconditionally holds, i.e. for all 𝛾 i, 𝛾 j, 𝜎j ≥ 𝜎i and 𝜌ij ∈ [−1;1]. For the low-volatility jurisdiction, however, 𝕍{pi} ≥
𝕍{p{i,j}} holds if and only if
𝛾j(𝜎2i − 𝜎
2
j
) + 2𝛾i𝜎i(𝜎i − 𝜌ij𝜎j) ≥ 0 ⇔
𝛾j
𝛾i
≤
2𝜎i(𝜎i − 𝜌ij𝜎j)
𝜎2
j
− 𝜎2
i
. (A.20)
For a given triple (𝜎i, 𝜎j, 𝜌ij), {i, j}-linkage effectively reduces volatility in the low-volatility jurisdiction provided that the
high-volatility jurisdiction’s 𝛾 is relatively not too large.
Finally, to establish the claim on price convergence in probability, we let  be ordered such that 𝛾1 ≤… ≤ 𝛾m, and denote
𝜎 = maxi∈𝜎i. Fix 𝜀 > 0. Then, it holds that
ℙ
(|Θ̂ − 𝔼{Θ̂}| > 𝜀) ≤ 𝔼{(Θ̂ − 𝔼{Θ̂})2} ∕𝜀2 = 𝕍{Θ̂}∕𝜀2
=
m∑
i=1
{
𝛾2
i
𝜎2
i
+
m∑
j=1
𝜌ij𝛾i𝛾i𝜎i𝜎j
}
∕(𝜀Γ)2
≤
(
𝛾m𝜎
𝛾1𝜀
)2 [
1
m
+ 1
]
,
(A.21)
where the ﬁrst inequality is Chebyshev’s inequality and the second follows by construction. Since 𝛾m and 𝜎 are ﬁnite, only when
the second term in the above bracket is nil (i.e. shocks are independent) does it hold that p converges in probability towards
p as || tends to inﬁnity, that is limm→+∞ℙ(|Θ̂ − 𝔼{Θ̂}| > 𝜀) = 0, i.e. limm→+∞ℙ(|Θ̂ − 𝔼{Θ̂}| ≤ 𝜀) = 1.
A.5. A proof for the non-alignment of preferences
We prove the following claim for the non-alignment of linkage preferences:
In the absence of inter-jurisdictional monetary transfers, jurisdictional linkage preferences are not aligned in the sense that:
(a) -linkage may or may not be the most preferred linkage group for all jurisdictions in ;
(b) any  ⊂  cannot be the most preferred linkage group for all jurisdictions in .
Fix ′ ⊂ . Let  ⊃ ′ be a proper superset of ′ and denote by ″ =  ∩ ′ the complement of ′ in . By way of contradic-
tion, assume that 𝔼{𝛿′,i} ≥ 𝔼{𝛿,i} holds for all i ∈ 
′, with at least one inequality holding strictly. By summation over i ∈ ′∑
i∈′
𝔼{𝛿′,i} = 𝔼{Δ′} >
∑
i∈′
𝔼{𝛿,i} = 𝔼{Δ} −
∑
i∈″
𝔼{𝛿,i} (A.22)
Recalling that Δ{′,″} = Δ − Δ′ − Δ″ , Equation (A.22) imposes
𝔼{Δ″} + 𝔼{Δ{′,″}} −
∑
i∈″
𝔼{𝛿,i} < 0, (A.23)
and contradicts superadditivity, which requires the above expression to be non-negative. That is, ′ cannot be the most weakly
preferred linkage coalition for all jurisdictions thereof.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4 (endogenous cap selection)
Let Di denote i’s damage function with MDi = 𝜂i constant and positive. For any partition  of  we let Ω−i =
∑
j∈⧵{i}𝜔 ,j
where 𝜔 ,j is j’s cap given  . Let also = {{1},… , {n}} denote complete autarky. The autarkic Cournot-Nash caps satisfy, for
all i ∈ 
𝜔,i = argmax
𝜔>0
𝔼
{
Bi(𝜔;𝜃i) − Di
(
𝜔 + Ω−i

)}
= 𝛾i(𝛽i − 𝜂i) > 0. (A.24)
By identiﬁcation with Equations (4) and (5) we ﬁnd jurisdictional ambition parameters and expected autarky permit prices
to be 𝛼i = 𝛽 i − 𝜂i ∈ (0;𝛽 i) and pi = 𝜂i > 0.
Jurisdictional regulators can anticipate linkage when selecting their caps. This situation is congruent with a two-stage game
where regulators set caps at stage one and permit trading between linked markets occurs at stage two.We solve this game using
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backward induction and focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Fix a partition  of . Crucially, because reaction functions
are orthogonal, individual cap-setting decisions in any  ∈  will only be affected by the perspective of -linkage but not by
what happens outside .
Stage 2: Inter-jurisdictional permit trading and emissions choices.
Take any  ∈  . Given cap and realized shock proﬁles (𝜔i)i∈ and (𝜃i)i∈, Equations (7) and (6) respectively give the equilib-
rium permit price p∗

and emission level in i q∗
,i
p∗

(Ω; (𝜃i)i∈) =
(∑
i∈
𝛾i𝛽i − Ω
)
∕Γ + Θ̂, (A.25a)
and q∗
,i(Ω; (𝜃i)i∈) = 𝛾i(𝛽i + 𝜃i − p
∗

(Ω; (𝜃i)i∈)). (A.25b)
We then obtain the intuitive comparative statics results: 𝜕p∗

∕𝜕Ω = 𝜕p∗∕𝜕𝜔i = −1∕Γ < 0 and 𝜕q
∗
,i
∕𝜕Ω = 𝜕q∗,i∕𝜕𝜔i =
𝛾i∕Γ ∈ (0;1).
Stage 1: Cournot-Nash domestic cap selection.
Upon setting its cap, each regulator knows ﬁrms’ optimal emission reactions and recognizes the implications of its decision
on the expected permit price and its own net market position. The Cournot-Nash caps with strategic anticipation of -linkage
(𝜔,i)i∈ satisfy, for all i in ,
𝜔,i = argmax
𝜔>0
𝔼
{
Bi
(
q∗
,i(𝜔 +Ω
−i

; (𝜃i)i∈);𝜃i
)
− Di(𝜔 + Ω−i ) + p
∗

(𝜔 +Ω−i

; (𝜃i)i∈)
(
𝜔 − q∗
,i(𝜔 + Ω
−i

; (𝜃i)i∈)
)}
,
(A.26)
where the third term is the net proceeds from inter-jurisdictional permit trading. By stage-2 optimality, i.e. 𝜕Bi(q∗,i;𝜃i)∕𝜕qi = p
∗

,
the necessary ﬁrst-order condition writes
𝔼{p∗

} − 𝜂i = 𝔼
{
𝜕p∗

𝜕Ω
(q∗
,i − 𝜔,i)
}
= (𝜔,i − 𝔼{q∗,i})∕Γ. (A.27)
Summing over i ∈  and by market closure, we obtain 𝔼{p∗

} = ⟨𝜂⟩ = ∑i∈𝜂i∕||. It thus holds that 𝜔,i − 𝔼{q∗,i} =
Γ(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂i), i.e. jurisdiction i is net selling under -linkage in expectation i.f.f. its marginal damage is lower than ’s aver-
age. Since 𝔼{q∗
,i
} = 𝛾i(𝛽i − ⟨𝜂⟩), we have
𝜔,i = (Γ − 𝛾i)(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂i) + 𝜔,i ≥ 𝜔,i ⇔ ⟨𝜂⟩ ≥ 𝜂i. (A.28)
In aggregate, (anticipated) linkage leads to higher emissions relative to autarky i.f.f.∑
i∈
𝜔,i − 𝜔,i =
∑
i∈
𝛾i(𝜂i − ⟨𝜂⟩) ≥ 0. (A.29)
As in Helm (2003), inter-jurisdictional permit trading has an ambiguous effect on aggregate pollution, which depends on
the distributions of the 𝜂i ’s and 𝛾 i ’s. Consider for instance the special case of marginal damages proportional to ﬂexibilities, i.e.
𝜂i = 𝜂𝛾 i for all i ∈ . Then,∑
i∈
𝜔,i −𝜔,i = 𝜂
∑
i∈
𝛾i(𝛾i − ⟨𝛾⟩) = 𝜂∑
i∈
𝛾i
(
(|| − 1)𝛾i −∑
j≠i
𝛾j
)
∕||
= 𝜂
∑
i∈
∑
j≠i
𝛾i(𝛾i − 𝛾j)∕|| = 𝜂 ∑
(i,j)∈2
(𝛾i − 𝛾j)2∕(2||),
which is always non-negative and positive provided that there exists (i, j) ∈ 2 such that 𝛾 i ≠ 𝛾 j, but note that our result is
reversed if we assume 𝜂i = 𝜂∕𝛾 i for all i ∈  instead.
Welfare gains from linkage accruing to jurisdiction i belonging to any linkage group  ∈  amount to
Bi(q,i;𝜃i) − Bi(𝜔,i;𝜃i) + p(𝜔,i − q,i) + Di(Ω) − Di(Ω ). (A.30)
By adding and subtracting p𝜔,i it is convenient to decompose the expected welfare gains from linkage 𝔼{𝛿∗i,} into eﬃ-
ciency gains from inter-jurisdictional permit trading, strategic effect due to domestic cap selection in anticipation of linkage,
and damage effect, that is
𝔼{𝛿∗
i,} = 𝔼{Bi(q,i;𝜃i) − Bi(𝜔,i;𝜃i) + p(𝜔,i − q,i)} + 𝔼{p(𝜔,i − 𝜔,i)} + 𝔼{Di(Ω) − Di(Ω )}. (A.31)
After standard computations, we ﬁnd each of these components to be worth
𝔼{Bi(q,i;𝜃i) − Bi(𝜔,i;𝜃i) + p(𝜔,i − q,i)} = 𝛾i
(
(𝜂i − ⟨𝜂⟩)2 + 𝕍{𝜃i − Θ̂}) ∕2, (A.32)
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𝔼{p(𝜔,i −𝜔,i)} = ⟨𝜂⟩(Γ − 𝛾i)(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂i), (A.33)
and 𝔼{Di(Ω) − Di(Ω )} = 𝜂i
∑
∈
∑
j∈
𝛾j(⟨𝜂⟩ − 𝜂j). (A.34)
A.7. Proof of Proposition 5 (intertemporal trading)
We take the perspective of a group which might be degenerate, i.e. a single jurisdiction. The group-wide shock and beneﬁt
parameters (linear intercept and slope) obtain by horizontal summation of the individual marginal beneﬁt schedules. In the
following, we drop the group index for clarity and without loss of generality.
We adopt a dynamic programming approach and assume that time t runs in ⟦1; T⟧where T is the date at which the problem
effectively ends. Let bt ≷ 0 denote the volume of the permit bank at time t (a negative bank corresponds to borrowing) with
b0 = 0 and bT ≥ 0. At each time t the group emits qt = 𝜔t + bt−1 − bt and faces the recursive optimization problem
Vt(bt−1;𝜃t−1) = max
bt
[
Bt(𝜔t + bt−1 − bt;𝜃t) + 𝜆𝔼t{Vt+1(bt;𝜃t)}
]
, (A.35)
where bt is the control variable to simplify taking derivatives, and 𝜆 denotes the discount factor. The ﬁrst-order condition reads
and the envelope theorem yields
−MBt(qt;𝜃t) + 𝜆𝔼t
{
𝜕Vt+1
𝜕bt
(bt;𝜃t)
}
= 0, (A.36a)
𝜕Vt
𝜕bt−1
(bt−1;𝜃t−1) = MBt(qt;𝜃t), (A.36b)
so that we obtain the standard result that the discounted equilibrium marginal beneﬁt (i.e. the discounted permit price) is a
martingale via the no-arbitrage condition under uncertainty
MBt(qt;𝜃t) = 𝜆𝔼t{MBt+1(qt+1;𝜃t+1)}. (A.37)
p⋆
t
= MBt(qt;𝜃t) = 𝜆𝔼t{MBt+1(qt+1;𝜃t+1)} = · · · = 𝜆h𝔼t{MBt+h(qt+h;𝜃t+h)}, (A.38)
where we have used the tower rule (𝔼t{𝔼t+z{·}} = 𝔼t{·} for any z ∈ ⟦0; h⟧), together with overall market closure at the termi-
nal date bT ≥ 0, or
∑T
z=t qz ≤ bt−1 +
∑T
z=t 𝜔t . The period-t expected price path satisﬁes Hotelling’s rule.
To simplify computations and without loss of generality, we assume that 𝛽 t = 𝛽 t+1, 𝛾 t = 𝛾 t+1 and 𝜔t = 𝜔t+1 for all t.
Solving Equation (A.38) with period-Tmarket clearing thus yields
𝔼t{p⋆t+z} = 𝜆
−zp⋆t for any z ∈ [[0; h]] with p
⋆
t =
(
(h + 1)p − bt−1∕𝛾 + 𝜃tΦ
)
∕Λ. (A.39)
Setting bt−1 = 0 then gives Equation (24), and Equation (26) follows thanks to the linearity of both the group-wide shock in
the individual shocks and the group’s expected price in the expected autarky prices. Our determination of p⋆
t
(and below 𝛿⋆
i,,t
)
can be extended to allow for time varying caps and beneﬁt functions as well as heterogeneity in discounting.
Equation (27) obtains by computing 𝛿⋆
i,,t
and taking expectation. Comparing Equations (10) and (27), we have 𝔼{𝛿⋆
i,,t
} =
𝔼{𝛿i,,t} only when h = 0 or when𝜑i = 1 for all i ∈  and 𝜆 = 1.When h ≥ 1, it is typically the case that 𝔼{𝛿⋆i,,t} ≠ 𝔼{𝛿i,,t}
and their ordering will depend on the values of the jurisdiction-speciﬁc persistence parameters, the common discount factor
and the length of the time horizon. We note that when h →∞ or 𝜆 → 0, intertemporal permit trade attenuates the eﬃciency
gains due to linking towards zero, i.e. 𝔼{𝛿⋆
i,,t
}→ 0. In particular, given an arbitrary 𝜆 < 1 there exists a threshold value of h
above which 𝔼{𝛿⋆
i,,t
} < 𝔼{𝛿i,,t} holds unambiguously. When h is small the ordering of 𝔼{𝛿⋆i,,t} and 𝔼{𝛿i,,t} depends on the
complex interaction between h and shock properties {𝜎i, 𝜌ij, 𝜑i}i,j∈ . We explore this analytically below in the case of a bilateral
link.
The aggregate and jurisdictional risk-sharing gains due to {i, j}-linkage are proportional to
RS⋆ =
(
Φ2
i
𝜎2
i
+ Φ2
j
𝜎2
j
− 2𝜌ijΦiΦj𝜎i𝜎i
)
∕Λ2 or RS = 𝜎2
i
+ 𝜎2
j
− 2𝜌ij𝜎i𝜎j (A.40)
with orwithout intertemporal trading, respectively, whereΦi =
∑h
z=0 𝜑
z
i
andΛ =
∑h
z=0 𝜆
−z. Let prime denote the partial deriva-
tive w.r.t. 𝜑i, then we have
RS′⋆ ≥ 0 ⇔ Φ
′
i
Φi𝜎i ≥ 𝜌ijΦ′iΦj𝜎j (A.41)
since (Φ2
i
)′ = 2Φ′
i
Φi whereΦ′i =
∑h
z=1 z𝜑
z−1
i
. In general, RS′⋆ ≷ 0 which crucially depends on the behavior of and the interaction
between the series Φi, Φj, and Φ′i . The former, Φi , is equal to h + 1 when 𝜑i = 1; positive and increasing with 𝜑i and h when
𝜑i ∈ (0;1); equal to 1 when 𝜑i = 0; non-monotonic in 𝜑i and h but non-negative for 𝜑i ∈ (−1;0); alternating between 0
and 1 when 𝜑i = − 1. Its partial derivative, Φ′i , is positive and increasing with 𝜑i and h when 𝜑i > 0; equal to 1 for all h
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when 𝜑i = 0; non-monotonic in 𝜑i and h but non-negative for 𝜑i ∈ [−0.5;0); of alternate sign (negative for h ≥ 3 and odd)
below some threshold h value and then always positive when 𝜑i ∈ (−1; −0.5); of alternate sign (negative for all h odd) when
𝜑i = − 1. In the two-period no-discount case h = 𝜆 = 1, Equation (A.41) simpliﬁes to RS′⋆ ≥ 0 ⇔ (1 + 𝜑i)𝜎i ≥ 𝜌ij(1 +𝜑j)𝜎j.
Similarly, it is not straightforward to compare RS⋆ and RS. Indeed,
RS⋆ ≥ RS ⇔ (Φ2i − Λ
2)𝜎2
i
+ (Φ2
j
− Λ2)𝜎2
j
− 2𝜌ij(ΦiΦj − Λ2)𝜎i𝜎j ≥ 0, (A.42)
The behavior of Φ2
i
is like that of Φi. Series Λ is equal to h + 1 at most when 𝜆 = 1 for all h; increasing with h; decreasing
with 𝜆. By contrast, it is straightforward to show that allowing for intertemporal trading always reduces the effort-sharing gains
from linkage by a fraction ((h + 1)∕Λ)2. In the two-period no-discount case h = 𝜆 = 1with𝜑i = 1, effort sharing is unaltered
and Equation (A.42) simpliﬁes to RS⋆ ≥ RS ⇔ 𝜌ij(3 + 𝜑j)𝜎i ≥ 𝜎j.
Finally, we clarify the mathematical statement in footnote 23 by specifying the behavior of the series Φi∕Λ. It is equal to 1
when 𝜑i = 1 and 𝜆 = 1; increasing with 𝜑i and 𝜆 and decreasing with h when 𝜑i ≥ 0; essentially increasing with 𝜑i and 𝜆
and decreasing with hwhen 𝜑i < 0, although may be non-monotonic locally for small h values and large 𝜆 values.
B. Calibration methodology
This appendix describes the calibration of jurisdictional annual emission caps (𝜔i), baseline emissions (qi), volume-adjusted
technologies (𝛾 i) and linear intercepts (𝛽 i) based on proprietary data we obtained from Enerdata; and the calibration of price
shock volatilities (𝜎i), the pairwise correlations across jurisdictions (𝜌ij) and the AR(1) shock persistences (𝜑i) based on IEA
data on historical power sector emissions. In our quantitative illustration we focus on ﬁve jurisdictions with similar levels of
development and which all use, or have considered using, both emissions trading and linking: Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN),
the European Union (EUR), South Korea (KOR) and the United States (USA).
We obtained annual emissions caps and MACCs of the power sectors from Enerdata. First, Enerdata models emission caps
consistent to three possible scenarios. The Ener-Brown scenario describes a world with durably low fossil fuel energy prices. The
Ener-Blue scenario provides an outlook of energy systems based on the achievement of the 2030 targets deﬁned in the NDCs as
announced at COP 21. The Ener-Green scenario explores the implications of more stringent energy and climate policies to limit
the global temperature increase at around 1.5–2 ◦C by the end of the century. We selected the scenario with annual emission
caps consistent with the Paris INDCs (Ener-Blue scenario).
Second, Enerdata also generates MACCs and annual emission baselines using the Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy
Systems (POLES) model. MACCs are available for four time periods (2025, 2030, 2035 and 2040). We selected emission base-
lines and the MACCs available for 2030. Using these annual caps and MACCs, we compute the expected autarky permit prices,
which range from 27.1 in AUS to 113.7$/tCO2 in Canada. All monetary quantities are expressed in constant 2005US$. A lin-
ear interpolation of MACCs around domestic caps gives the linear intercept 𝛽 i and the inverse of its slope 𝛾 i , reported in
Table 1.
The shock characteristics are calibrated using historical times series of CO2 emissions from the jurisdictional power sectors.
We obtain annual data covering 1972–2015 from the International Energy Agency. We denote observed emissions from juris-
diction i in year t by ei,t.We identify historical emission levels with laissez-faire emissions, i.e. we assume that no or relatively
lax regulations on CO2 emissions were in place prior to 2015.
In Equation (2) laissez-faire emissions q̃i comprise a constant term, the baseline qi = 𝛾i𝛽i , and a variable term, q̃i − qi = 𝛾i𝜃i.
Assuming the latter is small enough relative to the former, we obtain the following linear Taylor approximation for the natural
logarithm of laissez-faire emissions
ln(q̃i) ≃ ln(qi) + (q̃i − qi)∕qi. (B.1)
We associate the variable term in the above to the residual from the regression of ln(ei,t) on time and the square of time. In other
words, we use log-quadratic detrending to decompose ln(ei,t) into trend and cyclical components (Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé,
2017). This is consistent with our interpretation of variations in marginal beneﬁts of emissions as being driven by business
cycles, TFP shocks, changes in the prices of factors of production, jurisdiction-speciﬁc events, weather ﬂuctuations, etc.
Speciﬁcally, we denote the residuals from the regression 𝜖i,t . To calibrate shock characteristics, we assume that {𝜖i,t}‘s pro-
vide information about the distributions of the underlying shocks 𝜃i ’s. Then, given our modeling framework, 𝜖i,t is related to a
draw from the distribution of 𝜃i such that
𝜖i,t = (q̃i − qi)∕qi = 𝜃i∕𝛽i. (B.2)
Note that {𝜖i,t}‘s are mean zero by construction. We compute the standard deviation of 𝜃i consistent with the model using
𝜎i = 𝜎(𝛽i𝜖i,t), (B.3)
and the standard deviation of domestic laissez-faire power-sector emissions simply obtain by the rescaling 𝛾 i𝜎i. Table 3 below
reports the standard deviations of autarky permit prices (𝜎i) and normalized standard deviations of laissez-faire emissions
(𝜎(𝜖i,t) = 𝛾i𝜎i∕qi). The table also includes the estimated persistence parameter 𝜑i when an AR(1) model is ﬁtted to {𝜖i,t}. We
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used the estimated 𝜑i ’s to argue for the validity of the rule of thumb in Equation (28) discussed in the intertemporal trading
extension in Section 4.2.
Table 3
Standard deviations of autarky prices (𝜎i , 2005US$/tCO2), normalized
standard deviations of laissez-faire emissions (𝜎(𝜖i,t) = 𝛾i𝜎i∕qi) and AR(1)
shock persistences (𝜑i)
EUR AUS USA CAN KOR
𝜎 i 31.4 11.8 21.9 56.3 48.4
𝜎(𝜖i,t) 0.049 0.054 0.058 0.131 0.112
𝜑i 0.79 0.71 0.82 0.89 0.67
Note that price shock variabilities are roughly such that pi > 2𝜎i and 𝛽i > p + 2𝕍{Θ̂}1∕2 for any jurisdiction i and any pos-
sible group in our sample, i.e. zero-price and zero-emissions corners can safely be neglected.30 Therefore, our focus on interior
autarky and linking market equilibria is of negligible consequence for our analysis of linkage gains.
Finally, we calibrate pairwise correlation between shocks in i and j using
𝜌ij = Corr(𝛽i𝜖i,t, 𝛽j𝜖j,t). (B.4)
and note that the 𝜌ij’s – reported in Table 2 – can be positive, negative or approximately zero. We also note that this large
variation in inter-jurisdictional correlation is to be expected.
To seewhy note that emissions of jurisdictionswhose economies are tightly interconnected through trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows
will likely move together, especially if jurisdictions’ emissions are procyclical. If the economic links between jurisdictions are
weak and/or they are geographically distant, onewould expect a low level of correlation. Finally, if a jurisdiction’s business cycles
are negatively correlated with others, also observing negative correlations in emissions ﬂuctuations would not be surprising.
These conjectures are consistent with empirical studies such as Calderón et al. (2007) which provides evidence on international
business cycle synchronization and trade intensity, and Doda (2014) which analyzes the business cycle properties of emissions.
Finally, Burtraw et al. (2013) suggest that demand for permitsmay be negatively correlated over space due to exogenousweather
shocks.
We highlight the following three points regarding our calibration strategy and results. First, we assume that the pair char-
acteristics are not affected by the recent introduction of climate change policies. Some emitters in some of the jurisdictions in
our sample are regulated under these policies. We argue that any possible effect would be limited because these policies have
not been particularly stringent, affect only a portion of the jurisdiction’s emissions, and do so only in the last few years of our
sample. Second, we use the log quadratic ﬁlter to decompose the observed emissions series into its trend and cyclical compo-
nents. Not surprisingly, the calibrated shock characteristics are altered quantitatively when we alternatively use the band pass
ﬁlter recommended by Baxter and King (1999), the random walk band pass ﬁlter recommended by Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003) or the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter as detrending procedures. However, our conclusions are similar qualitatively so we restrict
our attention to the simple and transparent log quadratic detrending. Third, we take the calibrated 𝜌ij’s at face value in our
computations, rather than setting insigniﬁcant correlations to zero, which does not alter the results in a meaningful way.
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